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INTRODUCTION
A large amount of American law originates with private law-
making groups. This Article considers two of these groups, the
American Law Institute (the "ALI") and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"). The ALI is a
self-perpetuating organization of lawyers,judges, and academics. Its
primary function is to promulgate restatements of law. These
restatements are sets of rules, organized by subject matter, the
content of which is partly a function of the case law but also is a
function of the ALI's collective view respecting which legal rules are
normatively desirable for courts to apply. Restatement rules do not
have binding force but are advisory to courts. Inclusion of a rule in
a restatement, however, is widely thought to increase the likelihood
that courts will follow it.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws is an organization of "commissioners," each of whom is
appointed by the governor of her state. These commissioners are
also lawyers, judges, and academics. NCCUSL creates statutes-
called "uniform laws"-that it recommends to state legislatures. The
states often reject NCCUSL recommendations, but when they do
accept them, they commonly enact the NCCUSL statutes as written.
The ALI and NCCUSL jointly created America's longest and most
influential commercial statute, the Uniform Commercial Code (the
-UCC-).
The ALI and NCCUSL currently are engaged in a major revision
of the UCC. This process has already resulted in the revisions of
UCC Articles 3 and 4 (as well as the promulgation of Article 4A),
the recommended repeal of Article 6, and the addition of Article
2A. Completed revisions to Articles 5 and 8 are imminent. The two
revisions that remain are especially important events in commercial
law: Article 2, regulating sales, has never been revised, and Article
9, regulating secured lending, was last rethought in 1972.
The ALI and NCCUSL have created large portions of Ameri-
can contract and commercial law and have made major contribu-
tions in other areas as well, such as tort and property law. Despite
these groups' significance, they have never been seriously studied.
Rather, uniform laws and restatements have been evaluated as if
they were produced by rule-generating "black boxes." Lawyers
know that these boxes can produce bad laws as well as good ones,
so serious critical attention is devoted to ALI and NCCUSL
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products. In contrast, the relation between the institutional
structures of these organizations and the rules they adopt has been
entirely neglected. This lack of attention apparently is because ALI
and NCCUSL members are thought to be disinterested legal experts
who pursue only the public good: the task is not to study this ideal
but rather to extend it to other areas.
The legal community's inattention to the consequences of ALI
and NCCUSL procedures, however, is unjustified. Positive political
theory teaches us that the form and substance of a law are signifi-
cantly endogenous to the law-creating institution. Put more simply,
a legislature's output is a function both of the preferences of the
legislators, whether selfish or altruistic, and of the institutional
structure in which the legislators perform. Thus, ALI and NCCUSL
outputs also should be endogenous to their organizational forms.
This Article uses the tools of "structure-induced equilibrium"
theory' to study the ALI and NCCUSL. These tools were developed
to study typical legislatures, but their use is apt here because the
ALI and NCCUSL actually do function as private legislatures. The
analyst doing structure-induced equilibrium theory identifies the
utility functions that participants in the legislative process maximize,
specifies the institutional structures that transform participant
preferences into legislative outcomes, and then shows what
outcomes these preferences and structures will produce.' When this
method is applied to an institution that functions as the ALI and
NCCUSL do, it reveals that the institution (a) has a strong status
quo bias that induces it to reject significant reform; (b) frequently
produces highly abstract rules that delegate substantial discretion to
courts; and (c) produces clear, bright-line rules that confine judicial
discretion commonly when and because dominant interest groups
influence the process. These bright-line rules ordinarily advance the
interest group's agenda.
8
This Article is primarily positive; its goal is to understand how
large private law-making groups such as the ALI work. However,
the results we develop do have several normative implications.
First, when nationally uniform regulation of a subject is desirable,
1See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and
Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503, 504 (1981) (viewing "real-world legislative
practices [as] constrain[ing] the instability of [pure majority] rule by restricting the
domain and the content of legislative exchange").
2 See id. at 507-11.
s See infra part IID.2.
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society often has a choice whether to use federal legislation, federal
administrative rule-making, a uniform law, or a restatement. Today,
such choices are made on the two assumptions that politics can
importantly influence the Congress and federal agencies but that
politics do not influence the ALI and NCCUSL. We show here that
the latter assumption often is false. This showing should influence
the choice of which legal vehicle is best for regulating particular
subjects. In a related vein, the ALI's or NCCUSL's imprimatur
should count for less than it now does when a court or legislature
is deciding whether to adopt a legal rule.
The second normative implication relates to the debate as to
when a lawmaker should use "rules" (what we call bright-line rules),
and when it should use "standards" (what we call abstract rules).'
An implicit premise in this debate is that the lawmaker will choose
between rules or standards depending on which rule form would
best implement the policy at issue. We show, in contrast, that the
proportion of rules and standards in the ALI's and NCCUSL's
output is much more a function of the structural features of these
organizations than it is a function of conscious policy choice. The
nature of the debate about rules and standards should change if, in
important legal contexts, that debate cannot influence what the
lawmakers do.
Our analysis has an important pedagogical implication as well.
It is now customary to teach the substantive aspect of restatements
and uniform laws. For example, a sales law class will ask whether
the "open term" rule embodied in UCC section 2-204 is a good idea.
This pedagogical style would be considered naive in a course about
regulated industries, where both the substance of a statute or
regulation and the process that produced the rule are on the table.
It is recognized, in such discussions, that normative critique should
take account of what the relevant lawmaker is capable of doing and
is likely to do. Our analysis suggests that private law courses should
be taught on a similar level of sophistication.
In Part I of this Article, we describe ALI and NCCUSL proce-
dures and the "ethos" of these groups. We also develop a taxonomy
of legal rules that will facilitate our subsequent analysis of ALI and
4 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING By THE RULES 44-45 (1991); Colin S. Diver,
The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 73-79 (1983); Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559 (1992);
Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J.
1, 8 (1992).
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NCCUSL performance. Part II, the central section of the Article,
develops a theory of private legislatures. In particular, we model a
private legislature whose features are drawn from the descriptions
of the ALI and NCCUSL. In Part III, we test the predictions of the
model with data that are largely drawn from the commercial law
field, the area we know best. This evidence and an informal content
analysis of Uniform Commercial Code rules are consistent with the
predictions of our analysis.
Although our formal models generate clear results, for several
reasons, our conclusions are tentatively held. The analysis set out
below has the defects of a first try at a complex subject.' Further-
more, models should be tested not so much by their intuitive
plausibility as by the facts. Partly because there has been no serious
study of private law-making groups, there is no rigorous data. Thus,
the evidentiary base we use is composed largely of anecdote and
impression and is limited to business law fields. Nevertheless, when
both theory and casual empiricism point in the same direction, as
they do here, the intellectual burden of proof should shift. The
legal profession thus should no longer assume that groups such as
the ALI and NCCUSL ordinarily function well; rather, the quality of
their performance should be the relevant issue.
Finally, our analysis applies to those issues that implicate value
choices and are sufficiently important to attract interest groups.
NCCUSL furnishes useful technical expertise to state legislatures in
areas where there is a consensus on the underlying values and where
the resulting statutes cannot create large winners and losers. The
set of such "technical subjects" is, however, considerably smaller
' Except for two papers, the slate is clean. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H.
Kobayashi, A Theory of Uniform Laws 7-10, 26-29 (Jan. 30, 1994) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (attempting to
develop criteria specifying when uniform laws are desirable and using positive
political theory to identify the factors that predict when NCCUSL products will be
widely adopted). Ribstein and Kobayashi do not model NCCUSL performance itself
but make helpful intuitive comments about how that group performs. They also do
not treat the UCC in depth. See generally id. See also Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group
Politics, Federalism, and the Uniforn Law Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform
Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 98 (1993) (providing history of the UCC in the
course of arguing that consumer interests have been slighted in the UCC drafting
process). Patchel attributes this result, in a brief discussion, to the fact that business
groups have lower coalition costs than consumer groups. See id. at 126-36. As will
appear below, a more modern explanation of how NCCUSL and the ALI function
focuses on the existence of asymmetric information between the members of these
organizations and the reformers and interest groups that attempt to influence them.
See infra part II.D.
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than the set of subjects that NCCUSL and. the ALI attempt to
regulate.
I. THE NATURE OF PRIVATE LAW-MAKING GROUPS
AND THE LEGAL RULES THEY PRODUCE
A. The ALl
The ALI is a private law-reform group that chooses its own
members.6 These persons, as well as the members of its governing
council, are lawyers, legal academics, andjudges. The ALI proposes
restatements, promulgates the UCC and its revisions (in collabora-
tion with NCCUSL), and sponsors special projects. The ALl council
decides whether a restatement is desirable. If so, the president, on
the recommendation of the director7 and with the council's ap-
proval, selects a reporter and a set of associate reporters to draft the
restatement. The reporters commonly are academics in the relevant
field. The ALI council also provides the reporters with an advisory
group, which is composed of academics and ALI members. The
reporters are responsible for the content of draft restatements.
These drafts go initially to the council, which sometimes requests
changes. The product on which the reporters and council agree is
then sent to the full membership for discussion. The membership
meets annually for one week, but no more than one and a half days
are devoted to any one subject. Discussions in the larger body
occasionally result in changes in the work. A restatement is
promulgated after it is approved by the council and by the member-
ship at an annual meeting. Promulgation is a recommendation to
courts to adopt sections of the restatement in the process of
common-law adjudication.
UCC projects proceed differently. There is a Permanent
Editorial Board for the Code, which is composed of representatives
from NCCUSL and the AL, with the ALI director ex officio. The
Permanent Editorial Board meets twice a year. In addition to
issuing periodic commentary on particular problems of interpreta-
tion, the Board sends recommendations for Code revisions to
NCCUSL and the ALI. If these groups agree that a revision may be
6 The information in this and the next two paragraphs is based on an interview
with Geoffrey Hazard, Director of the American Law Institute, in New Haven, Conn.
(Oct. 26, 1992), discussions with ALI members and reporters, and our personal
experience.
" The ALI director is the organization's chief paid professional.
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desirable, the ALI president appoints a "study group" to prepare a
report. This action is taken on the recommendation of the director,
who consults with NCCUSL and the ALI council; the latter body
must approve study group membership. A study group commonly
has an academic reporter and other academics as well as practi-
tioners, but the division of authority differs from restatement
practice: a UCC study group as a whole, rather than the academic
reporters, has the final say as to a draft report's contents. Accord-
ing to the ALI Director, Geoffrey Hazard, the principal criteria
governing the composition of a study group are expertise in the
subject, credibility with the ALI council, and an appropriate mix of
academics and practitioners.
A study group's report is sent to the ALI and NCCUSL, where
it proceeds on parallel tracks. The ALI commonly approves study
group reports, but approval does not exhaust the ALI's function.
Thereafter, the ALI is consulted about the composition of NCCUSL
drafting committees and must approve proposed changes to the
Code. NCCUSL, in turn, is responsible for putting reports in the
form of statutes and for recommending these drafts to legislatures.
According to Hazard, study group reports are very influential in
determining the content of proposed UCC legislation: "That is the
whole idea" of doing reports.
B. NCCUSL
The Conference creates uniform laws that it proposes to state
legislatures. It also creates model acts when it wishes to influence
the direction of law reform but believes that an area is too unsettled
to support the adoption of a uniform law. The Conference is
composed of "commissioners" who are appointed for three-year
terms by the governors of their states. Commissioners are lawyers,
judges, and academics.8  Appointment as a commissioner is
regarded as nonpolitical, and commissioners commonly are
reappointed. A state can have as many commissioners as it likes,
but voting at national meetings is done by state on important issues,
including whether to approve a proposed uniform law. Each state
has one vote, which reflects the choice of a majority of the state's
'The NCCUSL constitution requires commissioners to be members of the bar.
See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS NINETY-
EIGHTH YEAR 400 (1994) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] (citing NCCUSL constitution,
§ 2.4). There currently are more than 300 commissioners. See id. at 1-11.
602 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143:595
commissioners. The Conference meets annually for a week or less
to review the laws and model acts that its committees create. 9 An
academic reporter for a recent project described NCCUSL as "a
state-sponsored and -funded nonpolitical organization dedicated to
promoting improvement and uniformity in state law.""0
When the Conference decides that a uniform law is advisable,
it appoints a drafting committee."1  According to prominent
commissioners, members of drafting committees "are selected to
achieve a breadth of experience and perspective." 12 Academics
commonly are reporters for these committees, but "real lawyers" are
in charge;"8 that is, the lawyer commissioners and reporters have
the final say concerning the content of any proposal that is
forwarded to NCCUSL commissioners for discussion and adop-
tion.14 Despite this real-world emphasis, NCCUSL has difficulty
getting its products enacted. Of more than two hundred proposed
uniform acts, 107 have been adopted in fewer than ten states;
seventy-seven have been enacted in less than five.' 5 The Confer-
ence has had its greatest success in the commercial area. Of the
twenty-two acts adopted in more than forty states, nine have been
commercial.' 6 At least four others, such as the Uniform Act to
Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in
Criminal Proceedings and the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney
Act, have dealt uncontroversially with the legal system itself.17 The
Conference also has been moderately successful in the probate and
trust field.'"
9 See id. at 396-97, 404-05.
10 Lawrence W. Waggoner, William T. Pierce, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2079,2079 (1991).
NCCUSL itself lists the need for and achievability of uniformity as its most important
criteria in deciding whether to create a new act. See HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 439.
1 See HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 397.
12 Frederick H. Miller et al., Introduction to Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey:
The Centennial of the National Conference of Commissioners on Unform State Laws, 46
BUS. LAW. 1449, 1450 (1991). Professor Miller is NCCUSL's Executive Director.
" SeeJohn H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reforming the Law of Gratuitous
Transfers: The New Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 871, 876 (1992) (explaining
that "[o]ne of the characteristic features of uniform law drafting projects.., is the
convention that practicing lawyers should oversee the work of academics").
14 See id.
15 See James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096, 2103 (1991).
Ribstein and Kobayashi have an appendix that lists the adoption rates of every
NCCUSL product and gives a thorough description of how NCCUSL functions. See
supra note 5.
16 See White, supra note 15, at 2103-05 nn.35-40.
17 See id. at 2104.
18 See id.
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C. The ALl and NCCUSL Approach
The ALI and NCCUSL take a similar intellectual approach.
Both groups purportedly prefer to deal with technical issues that
legal expertise can resolve, not matters whose resolution requires
controversial value choices or would be aided by social science or
philosophical skills.1 9 Consequently, both groups perceive them-
selves as doing technical (in the old-fashioned phrase "scientific")
work, not policy analysis, and both prefer nationally uniform
solutions.
20
" The ALI's approach is best articulated in the report that was the basis of its
founding and that remains influential today. That report recited:
The fact that a man is a lawyer does not make him an expert on the tariff
•.. or enable him to speak with authority on hundreds of other questions
of existing or proposed law debated ... in legislative assemblies. It is
therefore ... vital to the permanent usefulness of the proposed organiza-
tion that we regard its activities as restricted to improvements in existinglaw
... in relation to those subjects of which the legal profession has expert
knowledge.
It is the province of... legislative bodies.., to express the political,
economic and social policies of the nation .... The proposed organization
should concern itself with such matters as... the details of private law....
It should not promote or obstruct political, social or economic changes ....
... Changes in the law which are, or which would, if proposed, become
a matter of general public concern and discussion should not be considered,
much less set forth, in any restatement of the law such as we have in mind.
Changes which.., will carry out more efficiently ends generally accepted
as desirable are within the province of the restatement to suggest.
Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the
Improvement of the Law Proposing an American Law Institute, 1 A.L.I. PROC. 1, 4-5, 15
(1923) [hereinafter Report Proposing the ALI].
NCCUSL also claims to adopt this approach. Knowledgeable observers
commonly say that NCCUSL takes a conservative approach to law reform, avoiding
"novel" areas. Its current guidelines for creating uniform laws recite that the
commissioners should avoid subjects that are "entirely novel" and "controversial
because of disparities in social, economic or political philosophies among the various
states." HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 440.2
1 See Report Proposing the ALl, supra note 19, at 35 (stating that the proposed
organization [the ALI] will do "constructive scientific juristic work"); id. at 65
(concluding that "[tjhe work of the proposed Institute is analogous.., in respect to
the character of the labor involved.., to those institutions founded to investigate the
cause of disease"). The successful motion to found the ALI, made on the basis of the
Report, recited that the ALI's object "shall be to promote the clarification and
simplification of the law and its better adaption to social needs .. and to encourage
and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work." William D. Lewis, Histoiy of the
American Law Institute and the First Restatement of the Law: "How We Did It" in
RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS 3 (1945).
The typical NCCUSL view is stated by a current reporter:
1995]
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These positions can be summarized in an "official" ALI and
NCCUSL view: public-spirited lawyers volunteer to resolve
important legal issues in technically correct and politically uncontro-
versial ways; their results are embodied in restatements and
proposed uniform laws that courts should follow or state legislatures
should enact as written.2 This preference prevailed for the UCC;
most states did adopt it largely as it came from the ALI and
NCCUSL.2 2  Despite the clarity of the intellectual approach
propounded by the ALI and NCCUSL, however, the evidence as
exemplified in the UCC itself and other laws and restatements
shows that both groups often fail to act in accordance with their
animating ethos. These institutions do venture into areas where
values conflict and traditional legal expertise is insufficient to
generate effective solutions to the problems at hand.
D. A Typology of Rules Produced by the ALI and NCCUSL
In order to evaluate the products of private law-making groups
such as the ALI and NCCUSL, we begin with a taxonomy of the
types of legal rules such groups produce. Legal rules commonly
take one of three forms. These forms are conveniently illustrated
by considering the task of creating a traffic rule regulating the speed
of automobiles. A Model 1 traffic rule would recite that driving
more than X miles per hour is prohibited. Such a rule is binary, in
[The Commissioners] are an elite group. Most of the Commissioners are
prominent lawyers... chosen because they have a more intellectual interest
in uniform law' than would a typical legislator....
... [T]he principal argument that the Commissioners can make on
behalf of a uniform law when it is considered by a state legislature is its
technical and substantive superiority over a law born in the back room of
a state legislature and sired by a lobbying organization.
White, supra note 15, at 2096-97.
21 See, e.g., Miller et al., supra note 12, at 1453 ("It is the position of the
Conference that uniform laws should ordinarily be adopted 'as written,' except in
unusual circumstances where minor changes may be necessary to conform with
paramount principles of local policy, law, and conditions."); DonaldJ. Rapson, Who
Is Looking Out for the Public Interest? Thoughts About the UCC Revision Process in the
Light (and Shadows) ofProfessor Rubin's Observations, 28 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 249, 260-61
(1994); see also Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 13, at 878-79 ("The possibility that
some fundamental flaw infects a uniform act is in any particular case not very
likely.... The simple truth is that the state enacting process seldom achieves the
depth of review that characterizes the uniform law drafting process.").
' See Additional Provisions: States Adopting the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 Secured
Transaction Guide (CCH) 4025 (July 12, 1994) (providing the additional provisions
added to the UCC by the states).
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that it purports to distinguish between compliance and noncompli-
ance with a single criterion. The rule also is "bright-line" because
it restricts the set of information on which application turns to
objective facts-X miles per hour-and thus is relatively easy to apply.
Model 1 rules have the virtue, from the viewpoint of the
legislature, of confining the rule applier's discretion (assuming that
the rule applier actually enforces rules as written; the discretionary
enforcement by police of the fifty-five-mile-per-hour speed limit
illustrates the difficulty of constraining discretion even when a rule
is clear on its face). The vice of Model 1 rules is their crudeness:
such rules are invariably both under- and over-inclusive. Thus, a
Model 1 rule can influence behavior only imperfectly."
Model 2 rules are written on a higher level of abstraction. For
example, a Model 2 rule would require persons to drive in a
"reasonable manner." Such abstract statements vest more discretion
in the rule applier than Model 1 rules permit. A possible conse-
quence of not articulating the specific criteria for application of the
rule in the rule itself is an increased risk of "misapplication" (the
rule may be applied in a manner inconsistent with the intent of the
rule maker).2 4 On the other hand, some believe, stating the
underlying norm (in this case "reasonable driving") in the rule itself
can increase the likelihood that the rule will be enforced in
accordance with its animating purpose.
25
A Model 3 rule attempts to find a middle ground between the
first two. Such a rule both includes and then purports to illuminate
the underlying norm that is set out in a Model 2 rule. As an
example: Persons must drive in a manner reasonable under the
23 See ROBERT E. ScoTr & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 339-
41 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing features of precise or per se rules and context-sensitive
or multifactored rules). A potential defendant who predicts that a Model I rule will
result in her conduct being subject to sanction may be deterred from socially
desirable activity (such as transporting a sick friend to the hospital in time to secure
treatment). On the other hand, a potential defendant who incorrectly predicts that
the rule will exonerate her conduct may engage in socially undesirable activity (such
as driving too fast in a snow storm). For more on the appropriate "fit" of Model 1
rules, see Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rule-
Making, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 268 (1974) ("Greater specificity of legal obligation
generates allocative inefficiency as a result of the necessarily imperfect fit between the
coverage of a rule and the conduct sought to be regulated.").
214 See Scorr & LESLIE, supra note 23, at 341 (explaining that because there are
more "relevant" facts that must be determined before the standard of "reasonable
behavior" can be applied, the rule applier may make an "error" with respect to one
or more facts).
' See e.g., id.
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circumstances. The factors relevant to assessing reasonableness
include (1) pavement conditions, (2) number of cars on the highway,
(3) the speed of other cars on the highway, (4) visibility conditions,
(5) eyesight and reflexes of this driver generally, and (6) the
condition of the driver at the time.
The multifactored character of Model 3 rules may induce a
better fit between rule application and the underlying norm than is
possible with Model 1 or Model 2 rules. Moreover, the enumeration
of application criteria in the rule itself apparently confines the rule
applier's discretion. Thus, it is tempting to conclude that Model 3
rules are "better" than either polar alternative. Model 3 rules,
however, will be as imprecise as Model 2 rules whenever the listed
factors nearly exhaust the relevant possibilities and the rule maker
does not attach weights to these factors or otherwise specify the
relationship among them. If the weights are not specified in the
rule, the rule in practice will differ little from a Model 2 rule,
because the factors that determine the Model 3 rule's application
may point in different directions. The Model 3 rules that have been
designed for commercial law and contracts commonly contain large
lists of unweighted factors. 26  For convenience, therefore, we
conflate the two categories and refer to both Model 2 and Model 3
rules as either Model 2 rules or "vague rules."
A legislator ideally should weigh the costs and gains of precision
in rule statement when choosing the appropriate rule form in which
to implement a policy, but legislators also consider the effect that
rule form will likely have on the status quo. A Model 2 rule
transfers much of the law-making authority from the rule maker to
the rule applier whenever the appliers of the particular rule are
numerous, diverse, and difficult for the rule maker to control. The
state courts that apply ALI and NCCUSL products are numerous,
diverse, and impossible for these law-making bodies to control.
NCCUSL, for example, has no power to overrule a state court that
gives content to a statutory phrase such as "reasonable" in a way
that NCCUSL did not intend. It is tempting to conclude, therefore,
that ALI and NCCUSL Model 2 rules do not change the status quo.
Rather, these rules appear merely to confer on state courts a power
to make law that those courts already possess. This view is too
strong, however. Putting NCCUSL's stamp of approval on a vague
" See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-102(2), 1-204, 9-504(3); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 154, 178, 241, 242 (1981).
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rule may cause some courts to be less reluctant to regulate an area
than they had been previously. Moreover, the choice of general
predicates may occasionally matter. For example, requiring persons
to drive "safely" may induce different judicial results than requiring
persons to drive "reasonably."
27
Notwithstanding these caveats, a legislature will change the
status quo much more significantly when it enacts a Model 1 rule
than when it enacts a Model 2 rule. The clarity and salience of a
Model 1 rule will influence the rule applier's decisions more
significantly than if the rule merely directed the applier to imple-
ment underlying norms as she conceives of them. On the other
hand, Model 2 rules grant broad discretion to the rule applier and
permit her to make only modest changes in the status quo or none
at all. We show below that the effect a rule will have on the status
quo is a much more important factor in influencing the choice-of-
rule form in the ALI and NCCUSL than the virtues and vices of
precision in rule statement.
II. MODELS OF PRIVATE LEGISLATURES
A. The Game and Its Outcomes
In this section, we develop a theory of private law-making
groups such as the ALI and NCCUSL. These groups function
similarly to legislatures. Rules are first proposed in committees that
are dominated by members with technical expertise. The initial
committee process results in a blueprint for reform that is delivered
to a second committee which casts the blueprint into statutory form.
The final product is then put to the larger body for a vote. 28 The
models developed below incorporate the salient features of such a
private legislature (or "PL").
Three types of participants act in PLs: (1) interest groups, such
as banks; (2) reformers, such as law professors; and (3) PL members
who attend annual meetings but do not participate in creating
27 In other words, vague rules can be transformative when they are cast in the
form of attractive principles. It is widely believed, for example, that UCC § 2-302,
which authorizes courts to ban "unconscionable" contract terms, has been transform-
ative in this sense. This belief has never been systematically tested.
28 See Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1803-06 (1994)
(providing an informal model of the ALI and NCCUSL as private legislatures, with
particular application to the Article 9 revision process).
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proposals. 9 We model the interaction of these participants as a
single-shot stage game. First, a reformer or interest group member
requests that a PL draft a proposed law. Second, the PL leadership
decides whether the PL should create a study group to consider the
matter. The probability that a PL will go forward increases with the
likelihood of widespread enactment because creating laws is costly.
We consider here the set of legal subjects that satisfies this
"enactment constraint"-that is, the set of subjects the uniform laws
of which are likely enough to be adopted to justify PL action.
30
Third, the study group creates a uniform law and reports its
proposal to the PL under a closed rule.3' A closed rule is assumed
because the size of PLs and the limited time they can devote to
particular proposals precludes significant floor amendments.
Fourth, the PL decides whether to adopt the proposal or reject it.3 2
Fifth and finally, a proposal that passes is introduced as a bill in
state legislatures. s
The enactment constraint that purportedly operates at the
second stage is seldom binding on PLs for three reasons. First, PLs
exist to do law reform. This generates pressure to create uniform
laws and model rules. Second, the probability of widespread
adoption is difficult to assess when a law-reform subject is proposed,
because it would entail predicting the behavior of a large number
of state legislatures and courts. Moreover, there is an extensive
time lag between the decision to consider a subject and the
promulgation of a law. For example, the UCC took twenty years to
"A reformer or an interest group member also can be a member of a PL. Most
PL member/legislators do not have a direct economic or policy-oriented interest in
any particular proposed law. Thus, it is convenient to treat these three participant
groups as if they were distinct.
50 We explain below why this enactment constraint is seldom binding on PLs.
"Study groups in actual PLs almost always submit proposals to the larger body
for a vote. Under a closed rule, the legislature can pass or reject a proposal but
cannot amend it on the floor.
" A PL can remand a proposal to the study group for further consideration.
Remands delay final determinations but do not preclude them. Hence, no generality
is lost by analyzing only the ultimate decision whether to accept or reject.
" When the ALI creates a restatement, the stage game differs in three ways from
the model above. First, a reformer or interest group member does not have the
option of avoiding the PL and introducing a proposed restatement directly into a
legislature because legislatures do not enact restatements. The analogue to initial
legislative introduction is to use test cases to establish the law. Second, and as a
consequence of the first point, the ALI process ends with promulgation of a
restatement. There is no later legislative stage. Third, the typical ALI committee that
drafts a restatement has more academics and fewer practitioners than the typical
NCCUSL study group.
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create. Such long delays make prediction difficult. As a conse-
quence, the pressure to generate proposals is hard to defuse even
with a plausible claim that a particular proposal has a low enactment
probability. Third, reformers, we will argue, view participation in
PLs as a gain and do not view the probability of ultimate enactment
of a PL proposal as a constraint. Hence, PLs have a large supply of
free labor to consider subjects and this inclines them to resolve
doubts in favor of creating proposals.
The low enactment rate of NCCUSL uniform laws is consistent
with this analysis. Because the enactment constraint is weak, we do
not analyze the legislative role; that is, we suppose that the decision
of a PL whether to accept or reject a proposal is not importantly
influenced by the likelihood that the proposal will be widely
enacted. 4
Our models of this game, developed and analyzed in the
remainder of this Article, yield the following results:
(1) When all of the participants in the PL process are symmetri-
cally informed about the consequences of reform proposals, (a) a PL
will produce many vague rules; (b) the ALI will produce more vague
rules than NCCUSL; and (c) an interest group will attempt to
participate on PL study groups and advisory boards and seek to
generate Model 1 rules when its preferences over reform are similar
to those of the PL itself, but interest groups will not lobby PL
legislators.
(2) When information is asymmetric (the typical PL member/
legislator is poorly informed about the consequences of proposals
while other participants know these consequences), the following
can be expected: (a) the penchant of a PL to produce vague rules
is either unaffected or may increase; (b) when only one interest
group would be affected by a PL reform proposal, the group will
attempt to participate in study groups and may also lobby, thereby
having a greater effect on PL outcomes than on ordinary legislative
outcomes;35 (c) an interest group may have less power in PLs than
in ordinary legislatures when interest groups compete over a reform
proposal; (d) as a consequence of (c), the presence of competing
interest groups before a PL should be less common than the
presence of a single group or no group at all, but a reasonable
G'Cf. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 5, at 40-46 (analyzing legislative reception
of NCCUSL projects).
" In the sense that it can get more Model 1 rules that advance its goals.
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equilibrium exists in which interest groups will compete; and (e) the
institutional bias of PLs to behave conservatively, eschewing
significant reform, is reinforced.
B. The Participants' Utility Functions and the
Information Structure
This section first describes the preferences of PL participants
informally and then gives a formal representation. An interest
group can only lobby an ordinary legislature; the group cannot
officially participate in the process of creating legislation. In
contrast, an interest group can participate in the process of creating
PL legislation by having its members, supporters, or lawyers
participate in PL study groups and on advisory boards.
An interest group has substantial incentives to participate in
these ways. Legislatures may be more likely to pass a reform if it
comes with the approval of the PL. Moreover, participation in the
PL may reduce the group's total lobbying costs. 6 Finally, the
payoff from successfully lobbying a PL can exceed the payoff from
lobbying Congress or federal agencies because uniform laws are
hard to alter. For example, suppose that the Federal Reserve Board
can be persuaded to adopt a regulation favoring banking interests
and that NCCUSL can be persuaded to propose a similar uniform
law that would be widely adopted. The banks would prefer the
uniform law because an administrative regulation can be repealed
with a change of agency membership, while the approval of
numerous states would be required to repeal the uniform law.
37
Reformers differ from interest group members in two relevant
ways. First, a reformer derives utility from a PL's passage of a
reform proposal independently of whether the proposal ultimately
becomes law. The reformer is commonly a law professor who can
write about and teach PL proposals because the proposals are
plausible candidates for becoming law. Moreover, status in
academia attaches to one who causes a PL to adopt a proposal. In
contrast, an interest group member derives utility from PL adoption
of a proposal only when adoption increases the likelihood or
reduces the costs of securing ultimate, stable legislative enactment.
Second, participation in a PL is consumption to a reformer; she gets
-' This would occur if the PL's own lobbying (if conducted) or the PL stamp of
approval caused legislatures to require less persuading.
" See White, supra note 15, at 2103.
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utility from being part of a law-reform movement. In contrast,
participation in a PL and before a legislature is production to an
interest group member. Because reformers benefit from PL
participation and from PL adoption of a law, they seldom are
constrained by legislative preferences. Reformers may not work for
proposals that have no chance of becoming law, but almost any
probability above zero will induce a reformer to participate in a PL.
The third participant is the PL member/legislator. Ordinary
legislators are interested in reelection prospects and in policy. PL
legislators are not elected and so may be thought to have an interest
only in policy, but this assumption is too strong. Law-reform
proposals generate both economic and political consequences. An
economic consequence is either the substantive effect a proposal
would have "in the world" or the direct effect the proposal would
have on a PL participant's income. As an example of economic
consequences, a proposal to cap tort damage awards may reduce
deterrence, shift wealth from the seriously injured to injurers, and
reduce the income of the plaintiffs' lawyers who are PL participants.
Commonly, only a small minority of PL participants have a direct
economic stake in the fate of any proposal.
A political consequence refers to the effect that a proposal could
have on a PL participant's reputation. Support for a proposal that
is regarded as utopian or foolish could damage a participant's
reputation for good judgment. A lawyer's income is a function of
his reputation, but reputational effects are sufficiently influential to
distinguish them from direct economic effects. Both the economic
and political effects of a proposal will influence how PL legislators
vote.
PL participants also derive utility from having a PL adopt a law-
reform proposal, independently of the merits of the proposal in
question. This is because participation in law-reform organizations
implies the desire to do at least some law reform. Consequently, PL
participants are inclined to reject the status quo. A participant
nevertheless may prefer the status quo to any particular reform
proposal that is presented to her, all things considered. We follow
standard political science practice and assume that the participant
preferences just described can be arrayed on a single linear
dimension and that those preferences are "single peaked."
Consider Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1
I I
a x y v z
A study group proposal of a new law can occupy any point on the
interval [a, zi; each point summarizes the consequences that a
particular law-reform proposal would generate. Point x represents
a PL participant's "ideal point"; that is, a proposal that would
generate the consequences represented by x maximizes the
participant's utility. The participant's preferences are single peaked,
in the sense that she does not strictly prefer an outcome that is
relatively far from her ideal point to an outcome that is relatively
close to it. For example, consider the proposal y. Were it to
become law, the illustrative participant's utility would be -(y - x)
because her utility declines as proposals move further from her
ideal point. Formally, lety and v be two points on the line such that
(y, v} 2_ x or [y, v} _ x. Then preferences are single peaked when
up(y) > up(v) - ' - xl < Iv - xl; that is, PL voter p prefers y to v
only if y is closer to x than v is.
8
Reformers and interest group members have utility functions
of the same form, but their ideal points may differ from those of
typical PL participants. The players' ideal points are assumed to be
exogenous; that is, a participant's preferences in policy space are
formed before she plays the stage game. This means that while
debate can influence which proposed law a participant will support,
debate will not influence, for example, the participant's relative
preference between stimulating commerce and protecting the
environment.
38 See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 65 (1989). For a particular proposal
y, the participant's utility function can be written up = -lY - xl. This formulation
implies that the participant is risk neutral. She would be risk averse were her utility
function to have the form up(x) = -N - x12. It is customary in political science
models to assume risk aversion in order to motivate the legislator's desire to create
institutions that reduce uncertainty concerning the effect of proposed laws. The
legislators analyzed here (PL voters) cannot create such institutions (to do so would
entail major constitutional reform in a PL). The voters, however, remain interested
in the location of proposals (that is, their consequences). Assuming risk neutrality to
analyze this concern does not affect the model's qualitative results. The effect of risk
aversion on PL behavior is briefly considered infra note 57.
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This assumption is made both because participant preferences
seem exogenous in PLs such as NCCUSL and the ALI and because
there is no endogenous mechanism for changing preferences. The
median voter's ideal point in an ordinary legislature can be affected
by logrolling, but there is no cross-subject logrolling in the ALl and
NCCUSL. Consequently, debate in a PL can only illuminate the
relation between proposals and their consequences; it cannot
change the preferences that typical (that is, disinterested,
nonreformer) participants have over those consequences. Logroll-
ing does not occur initially because reporters and drafting commit-
tees are recruited for particular projects and principally concentrate
on them: an ALL Article 9 reporter usually is unaware of what the
Article 2 reporters are doing, and never consults with them
officially."0 Reporter and drafting committee projects thus are
presented to the relevant PL as independent entities.
In order to logroll, therefore, the membership itself would have
to condition passage of one project on the passage of another. The
structure of the ALL and NCCUSL, however, makes logrolling on
the floor impractical. The ALI membership is three times the size
of Congress, heterogeneous, not organized in political parties, and
meets annually for one week.4" NCCUSL also is large, heteroge-
neous, lacks internal structure, and meets annually for a short
time.41 Hence, it is difficult to make numerous, significant deals
on the floor.
Logrolling also is risky because trades are hard to enforce. In
an ordinary legislature, committees enforce trades. For example,
consider a trade among legislators that would reduce corporate
taxes in return for increasing environmental protection. In a later
session, legislators who favor high taxes may wish to renege on the
trade and repeal the tax reduction. The committee that initiates tax
proposals can enforce the original deal, however, because amend-
ments to statutes in its jurisdiction cannot be considered by the
larger body without its consent-it is the gatekeeper for tax matters.
The parties that appoint committees have reputations to protect,
and so will choose committees that act as gatekeepers. Because
deals are enforceable, pro-business legislators may be willing to
trade with pro-environmental legislators. 2 PLs such as the ALI
"See supra parts I.A. & I.B. (describing the structure of the ALI and NCCUSL).
40 See supra part I.A.
41 See supra part I.B.
42 SeeJohn D. Huber, Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States,
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and NCCUSL lack enforcement power because they have no
gatekeeping committees. Reporters and drafting committees are
instructed to create single projects and are dismissed when projects
are completed." Without gatekeepers, a promise by one NCCUSL
or ALI faction to another not to change a proposed uniform law
seldom will be credible. Hence, trading on important issues is
risky. 4 In sum, if a PL cannot logroll, the assumption that PL
participants have exogenous ideal points in policy space is realistic.
Voting in the ALI and NCCUSL is by majority rule. This and
the assumption of single peakedness imply that the equilibrium
outcome of a PL vote will correspond to the preferences of the
median PL participant. Thus, we follow standard political science
practice in modeling a unicameral legislature in which only the
preferences of the median legislator are considered. We also
assume that study groups vote by majority rule. Hence, the
preferences of the median study group member determine study
group outcomes. When the median member is a reformer, we
describe the group as a "reformer-dominated study group";
similarly, when the median member belongs to an interest group,
the group is referred to as an "interest-group-dominated study
group." The assumption that study groups (in the usual case,
86 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 675, 677-78 (1992) (analyzing the legislative enforcement
problem); Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of
Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96J. POL. ECON.
132, 137-43 (1988) (same).
" Each draft of a NCCUSL study committee goes to a review committee before
presentation to the general body. Were there a single standing review committee, it
perhaps could arrange and police cross-subject trades. For example, such a
committee could prevent a proposed law from coming to a vote if it upset a prior
compromise. NCCUSL review committees, however, are appointed act by act and
each is directed to "evaluate the draft of an Act proposed for submission"; there is
no standing committee with the powers described here. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at
402, 411 (citing the NCCUSL Constitution article 4, § 4.3, and article 29, §§ 29.1,
29.2).
The ALI council reviews proposed laws and restatements before they go to the
membership. The council is a standing committee and thus could enforce trades.
There is no evidence that it does so.
"" Other evidence suggests that these PLs do not logroll. An overwhelming vote
in support of a rule implies the absence of logrolling. This is because a coalition, if
involved in logrolling, will try to give up as little as possible when compromising,
thereby garnering only a narrow margin of votes necessary to win. Thus, a vote that
reflects a trade should be close. See Thomas Stratmann, The Effects of Logrolling on
Congressional Voting, 82 AM. EcoN. REV. 1162, 1174 (1992); Gordon Tullock, Why So
Much Stability?, 37 PUB. CHOICE 189, 193-96 (1981). Impressionistic evidence
suggests that proposals commonly pass in the ALI and NCCUSL by large majorities.
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committees) can be modeled in this way is standard and does not
affect the results.4 5
Finally, obtaining information about a proposal's consequences
is costly. This implies the possibility of information asymmetries:
some players will find it worthwhile to become informed about the
consequences of proposals while others will not. An informed
player is said to have "expertise." We assume that study group
members have expertise owing to their roles. An interest group that
lobbies a PL is also assumed to have expertise (that is, to have
incurred the cost of evaluating a proposal). In the following
discussion, PL performance is analyzed first under the assumption
that the typical PL legislator/participant has expertise, and second,
under the assumption that she lacks it.
C. PLs Under Symmetric Information
We begin with the assumption that all PL participants are
equally (that is, "symmetrically") informed about the consequences
of any proposal. We do so in order to explore PL performance
under a variety of conditions. It is more plausible to suppose,
however, that the typical PL participant knows less than reformers
and interest group members do. Moreover, such an asymmetric
information model, which is set out below, explains more of the
data than the symmetric information model. Nevertheless, the two
models share many of the same predictions, a reassuring coherence
on the theoretical level.
First, assume that a study group proposes a related set of rules
to a PL and that all of the participants are symmetrically informed
as to the consequences of adopting those rules. Then, (i) a large
number of the rules that pass will be Model 2 rules; (ii) many of the
4 Study group members, as noted above, are chosen because they have expertise
and are credible with the larger body. See supra part II.A. These criteria also
influence the makeup of congressional committees. But see Keith Krehbiel, Are
Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?, 84 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 149,
149 (1990) (arguing that congressional committees can be more extreme and
homogeneous than the legislature as a whole). The policy preferences of potential
members sometimes influence appointment to legislative committees, but this
criterion seems less significant than the others. See KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION
AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 108-34 (1991) (discussing the various influences on
forming legislative committees). For this reason, we do not pursue the prospect that
a PL leadership will appoint a particular committee simply in order to get a particular
proposal. There is also little evidence that this happens.
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Model 1 rules that pass will advance the interests of industry groups;
and (iii) interest groups will not lobby PL legislator/members.
Four reasons support result (i). First, the description of the
participants' utility functions above implied that a vague rule that
leaves the status quo relatively intact is preferred, cet. par., to doing
nothing.46 Second, Model 2 rules are less likely to create reputa-
tional losses for participants and may actually create reputational
gains. Reputational losses are unlikely because these rules delegate
much of the legislative power to courts; thus, a PL participant
cannot be embarrassed by the adoption of a Model 2 rule in the way
she can be embarrassed by the adoption of a clearly directive Model
1 rule that actually accomplishes something. Reputational gains
derive from the fact that Model 2 rules commonly are couched in
phrases with positive affect (such as "good faith" or "reasonable")
or appear to consider all relevant factors; hence, a participant may
be thought to be well-motivated or sage when her PL adopts such
a rule. Third, vague rules can create direct economic gains for PL
participants. These rules increase or maintain uncertainty, and thus
increase, or do not reduce, the occasions on which lawyers will have
to give advice or be involved in litigation." Thus, these three
reasons imply a PL preference for Model 2 rules, but this preference
can be outweighed by a participant's preference for the consequenc-
es that a particular Model 1 rule would create.
The fourth reason why vague rules are common in a symmetri-
cally informed world is that, under this condition, study groups
often have an incentive not to propose Model 1 rules. As a
consequence, the other reasons that induce PL participants to
prefer Model 2 rules will go unchallenged. The argument that
supports this result requires some elaboration, but it is a significant
implication of the model. Moreover, this argument also implies that
when study groups do propose Model 1 rules, these rules commonly
will advance the interests of industry groups (result (ii)).
To understand why study groups will function in this way
(under conditions of symmetric information), it is necessary to
46 See supra part 1l.B.
4 See Michelle J. White, Legal Complexity and Lawyers' Benefit from Litigation, 12
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 381, 382 (1992) (noting that vague statutes require more
information gathering by lawyers when determining the potential complexity of a
case); Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 5, at 21 ("Lawyers can benefit from rules that
are complex and vague enough to discourage settlement, but not so complex as to
discourage litigation.").
PRIVATE LEGISLATURES
consider when a PL will pass a Model 1 rule. Point x in Figure 2 is
the median PL participant's ideal point.
FIGURE 2
I I I [
a y sq x b z
The status quo is represented by the point sq. In a symmetric-
information world, the median PL participant would support any
rule in the interval (sq, bi: x is equidistant from sq and a proposal
whose consequences are reflected in b. Hence, any proposal of a
Model 1 rule to the right of sq and to the left of b is preferred to sq
by the median participant and would pass. The set of rules in the
interval {sq, bi is the "win set."
A study group will anticipate the median PL participant's
behavior, and will then make one of three kinds of proposals. First,
if the study group's ideal point is in the interval {b, z}, the study
group will propose a Model 1 rule that is to the left of, but near, b.
This rule is better for the study group than sq and is closer than sq
to the median PL participant's ideal point; hence, the rule is better
for all and will pass. Second, if the study group's ideal point is in
the interval (sq, b}, the study group will propose the Model 1 rule
that is its ideal point. This rule is in the win set and so also would
pass. If the study group's ideal point is to the left of sq (for
example, at y), the study group will not propose a Model 1 rule.
Any proposal in the win set is further from the group's ideal point
than the status quo, so it prefers the status quo; any Model 1 rule
outside the win set would not be proposed because it would be
defeated.
A study group's best alternative to proposing a losing Model 1
rule often is to propose a Model 2 rule rather than none. To see
why this is so, consider the decision of an interest group to
participate in the process. In a symmetric-information world, a
study group will get its Model 1 rules adopted only if its preferences
are close to the preferences of the median PL voter. Interest group
members will not incur a participation cost unless the expected gain
is greater, that is, unless participation will sufficiently increase the
probability that the study group will propose a winning rule.
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Hence, interest groups participate on study groups if .(a) they will
have influence and (b) their preferred policies are in or, in this
illustration, to the right of the win set. When these groups do
participate, a study group probably will propose Model 1 rules. This
rule-type best constrains courts to follow the industry's policy rather
than their own.
Reformers also want to influence study groups when their
preferences are near the preferences of the median PL participant.
Reformers, however, prefer anything that can plausibly be called a
reform to the status quo. Thus, a reformer will participate on a
study group although the most likely consequence of participation
is that the PL will adopt Model 2 rules. This consequence actually
is likely because, as we argue below, reformers often have ideal
points that lie far from those of median PL participants.4" Hence,
reformers are reluctant to propose Model I rules in a PL's win set.
Because reformer-dominated study groups are common, and
because these study groups are preference outliers but want
"reform," study groups often will propose Model 2 rules. This,
then, is the fourth factor inclining PLs to the production of Model
2 rules.
4 9
The preceding analysis also explains why, in a symmetric-
information world, the Model 1 rules that PLs pass often will
advance the goals of interest groups. Industry groups will play only
when they can pass Model 1 rules (otherwise, their participation is
not cost-justified). Hence, given the incentive of reformers not to
propose Model 1 rules, the presence of Model 1 rules in a world of
symmetric information is a strong signal of industry influence.
Another testable implication of the conclusion that reformer-
dominated study groups will propose Model 2 rules is to compare
ALI restatements to NCCUSL uniform laws. Unlike NCCUSL
uniform laws, the ALI restatement projects do not employ broadly
48 See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
49 Our formal model assumes that the costs of creating Model l and Model 2 rules
are the same. This assumption sometimes is strong when a law is broadly applicable.
The more heterogenous the parties are to whom the law applies, and the greater the
variety of contexts in which the law is to apply, the more convenient it is for the
lawmaker to draft on a high level of abstraction. It is less costly for her to tell
persons to behave "reasonably" than to draft clear, sensible rules for a large number
of contexts. Because some uniform laws and restatements, such as UCC Article 2
(Sales) and the Restatement of Contracts, are broadly applicable, one would expect
them to contain at least some vague rules independently of the factors considered in
the text. A richer model would explicitly include rule-creation costs in the players'
utility functions.
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representative study groups, but rather rely on appointed academic
reporters and academic assistants to consider subjects." The
professors that constitute these bodies commonly have ideal points
that differ substantially from those of typical ALI participants.51
ALI reporters thus should propose many Model 2 rules; that is,
restatements should contain more vague rules than do uniform laws.
Our final result in the symmetric-information world is that while
interest groups may participate on study groups, they will not lobby
the PL in its role as a legislative body. Lobbyists attempt to get
results either by providing legislators with information or by altering
legislator preferences. In this model, the legislators are assumed to
be informed so there is no need to tell them anything, and their
preferences-their ideal points-are assumed to be exogenous so
lobbying cannot affect them. Interest groups thus will not lobby
because lobbying is costly.
52
We conclude this section with a remark about the symmetric-
information assumption. It seems implausible to suppose that the
typical PL participant knows the consequences of proposals because,
as the descriptions of the ALI and NCCUSL show, PL participants
lack the resources and time to make independent investigations of
these proposals. A participant can conveniently read most propos-
als, but reading seldom is enough. For example, the ALI's new
standard for how corporate directors should respond to unsolicited
takeover bids can be read in five minutes, but the economic and
political consequences of adopting that proposal are unclear without
doing a serious investigation of the subject. If typical PL partici-
pants will not make such investigations, how are they to become
informed?
o See supra part I.A.
51 For a summary of the evidence that academics tend to hold different
preferences than the general public, see SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, THE SOURCES OF
POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON AMERICAN CAMPUSES 10-12 (Hoover Inst., Stanford Univ.
Working Papers in Political Science P-92-1, 1992).
"2 Entrepreneurial lobbyists sometimes organize interest groups in order to
represent them. The existence of an interest group is by itself informative to a
legislator, who becomes aware of a relevant constituency. The role of lobbyist as
entrepreneur is not pursued here because the interest groups discussed have been
around for a long time. For a discussion of entrepreneurial lobbyists, see Scott
Ainsworth & Itai Sened, The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences, 37 AM.
J. POL. Sci. 835, 858-61 (1993). Lobbying sometimes consists of offering legislators
tangible benefits in order to change their preferences. Our assumption that
preferences are exogenous precludes such behavior. Also, we have no evidence that
tangible benefits are conferred on PL legislators. Thus, lobbying in this Article refers
to sending messages to these participants.
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When certain conditions are satisfied, "passive" PL participants
actually can be well informed about the consequences of proposals,
but these conditions are very demanding. To see why, suppose that
a study group has strictly monotone preferences over the median PL
participant's choice set. The policy issue is how much sellers should
be required to disclose about product safety, and an interest-group-
dominated study group wants as little disclosure as possible. The
PL's task is to choose a disclosure standard. If (i) the median PL
participant knows the study group's preferences precisely; (ii) the
study group can credibly disclose the truth about the consequences
of any particular disclosure standard; and (iii) the median PL
participant can conveniently (formally, costlessly) process all
information conveyed to her, then the participant will be fully
informed about the consequences of any study group disclosure
proposal.
The optimal strategy of an uninformed PL participant in this
game is to "assume the worst"; that is, to make the inference, on the
basis of what she does know, that is least favorable to the study
group. In the illustration here, the PL participant thus would
assume, contrary to the actual desire of the study group, that every
study group proposal requires the minimal amount of disclosure.
This assumption is least favorable to the study group because it
induces the participant to reject every proposal unless she prefers
minimal disclosure. As a consequence, the study group will always
waste the costs of creating proposals. This result is suboptimal for
study groups. A study group's best response to the participant's
"assume the worst" strategy thus is to choose among the following
alternative strategies (depending on the study group's preferences):
(a) make a disclosure proposal that is in the win set and tell the
truth about it; (b) propose a vague rule; or (c) propose no rule and
thus save rule-creation costs. Response (a) ensures that the median
PL participant will be well informed about the consequences of
meaningful reform proposals. Response (b) also is informative
because all participants can equally evaluate the consequences of
vague rules.
53
The strength of the conditions that generate this full-informa-
tion result suggests that PL participants seldom will be fully
informed. In particular, preferences over legal rules commonly are
"s The result that the informed party will disclose fully in the circumstances
assumed above is proved formally in Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the
Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18, 24-29 (1986).
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not strictly monotone (that is, rules often cannot be evaluated on
the simple dimension of more or less, as in the disclosure example,
but rather tradeoffs must be made); PL participants may know study
group preferences over the choice set only probabilistically; 4 study
groups sometimes cannot credibly communicate the consequences
of complex proposals; and PL participants often would find it too
costly to process all the relevant information.
When these common difficulties exist, PL participants who will
not make independent investigations of proposals will be poorly
informed about those proposals' consequences. In the next section,
therefore, we analyze PL behavior under the more realistic assump-
tion that PL participants commonly cannot distinguish among
substantively different proposals.
D. PLs Under Asymmetric Information
We generate three principal results in an asymmetric-informa-
tion world. First, the incentive of study groups to propose vague
rules in lieu of unpassable precise rules remains, and may even be
stronger. Second, interest groups may have more power or less
power in PLs than in ordinary legislatures, depending on whether
one interest group is interested in a proposal or whether interest
group preferences conflict. Third, when interest groups lack power
or there are no interest groups involved (only reformers are active),
the existence of asymmetric information reinforces the tendency of
PLs to behave conservatively.
1. Conservatism and the Uninformed PL's Decision Rule
An institution behaves conservatively if it commonly prefers the
status quo to reform. The status quo is not a PL participant's ideal
point, however. We thus call a PL conservative if it commonly
prefers the status quo to Model-l-style reform proposals. 55 In
order to see whether such a status quo preference exists, and to
understand the median PL participant's response to the efforts of
reformers and interest groups to exert influence, we begin by
" If preferences are not monotone and preferences are known only imperfectly,
then PL participants would be prevented from knowing which outcome is worst for
a study group. As a consequence, the median PL participant could not use the
"assume the worst" strategy.
-- To prefer vague new rules to the status quo, in our view, is not to be a serious
reformer.
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assuming that the participant is substantially uninformed. To be
precise, suppose (a) the median PL participant knows the location
of the status quo (that is, she can evaluate the consequences of
doing nothing); (b) she knows, in an approximate way, the proposal
space (the set of possible proposals that could be made on a
subject); (c) she has no independent knowledge of the consequences
of any proposal that is made to her; and (d) she can infer nothing
about a proposal's consequences from the composition or actions
of study group members.
The median PL participant's optimal decision rule for voting on
proposals in these circumstances is derived formally below, but the
rule has a simple intuitive version: if the median PL participant
likes the status quo, she should reject every Model 1 rule proposal
that is made to her; if she dislikes the status quo, she should accept
every such proposal that is made to her. The logic of this conclusion
follows from the fact that the median PL participant knows her ideal
point and the location of the status quo. Because she also knows
the proposal space, she can make a (rough) estimate of the
likelihood that she will prefer any particular proposal to the status
quo. In particular, if the participant likes the status quo, then there
is a fairly high probability that every meaningful reform proposal
(that is, Model 1 rule) will make matters worse for her; hence, she
should vote no. On the other hand, if the participant dislikes the
status quo, then there is a fairly high probability that every
meaningful reform proposal will make matters better for her; hence,
she should vote yes. The strategy of voting no if one likes the status
quo and yes otherwise we call the "uninformed decision rule." A PL
that uses this rule thus will have a conservative bias if the median
PL participant likes the status quo.
To derive the uninformed decision rule formally, we make two
further simplifying assumptions: (e) the set of possible proposals is
uniformly distributed on the unit interval; that is, each proposal in
the set of possible proposals is as likely to be made as any other,
and the proposal space equals the probability space; (f) the median
participant's ideal point, x, is to the right of the status quo, sq.
56
' These assumptions are innocuous. The first is standard and simplifies the
analytics. The argument made here applies to any symmetric distribution such as the
normal. As to the second assumption, we could derive the same uninformed decision
rule by fixing the median participant's ideal point to the left ofsq; the signs on the
initial equations would change, but would cancel in the solution.
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The PL participant derives utility U,q = -Isq - xJ from sq (see
Figure 3).
FIGURE 3
a sq x b z
Her utility from a reform proposal is U =-y - x1. A proposal is
better for the PL participant if U > Uq, or if -y - xI < -Isq - x1.
This inequality is not solvable because the median participant is
assumed not to know the location of y (that is, she cannot evaluate
the consequences of proposals). The participant, however, prefers
proposals that generate more utility for her than the status quo.
Thus, her optimal strategy is to vote yes if the probability that she
will prefer every proposal that could be made to her exceeds the
probability that she will not.
Every proposal in the interval {sq, bi generates more utility for
the median PL participant than the status quo. The probability that
any such proposal will be made is 2(sq - x) (assuming that proposals
are drawn from a uniform distribution on the unit interval).
Proposals in the intervals (a, sq} and [b, zi generate less utility for
the participant than the status quo. The probability that a proposal
will lie in the former interval is sq; the probability that a proposal
will lie in the latter interval is 1 - [sq + 2(x - sq)]. This leads to the
formal uninformed decision rule: vote yes when the probability that
every proposal would be better exceeds the probability that it would
not, or when 2(x - sq) > sq + 1 - [sq + 2(x - sq)]. This simplifies to
vote yes when x - sq > 14. The median PL participant thus will vote
no to every proposal unless her ideal point lies more than twenty-
five percent of the proposal space away from the status quo.5" In
" The analysis assumes that PL participants are risk neutral. A risk-averse
participant would reject proposals more frequently than the decision rule derived
above would direct because her utility declines at an increasing, rather than at a
uniform, rate as proposals move further from her ideal point (that is, referring to
supra note 38, u/"(x) < 0). Those who believe that PL participants are risk averse
rather than risk neutral thus should think that the argument for PL conservatism
made here understates the case.
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the language used above, a PL will behave conservatively unless its
median member is quite dissatisfied with the status quo.
This degree of dissatisfaction does not seem to exist for the PLs
we study. Observers often remark that the senior lawyers and
judges who constitute such PLs as NCCUSL, the ALI, and the
American Bar Association are unsympathetic to radical reform.
This preference is as much institutional as personal. Significant
reform requires a change in the underlying normative framework
that supports the legal regime. The ALI's founding documents and
NCCUSL's constitution, however, commit these PLs to reject
controversial reform and to restrict themselves to "technical"
improvements in the law. 8 That commitment to incremental
change implies that the median PL participant's ideal point lies near
in policy space to the status quo. And this in turn makes the
condition for voting yes hard to satisfy. As a consequence, these
PLs tend to behave conservatively.
Finally, study groups anticipate this voting behavior. Hence,
when a study group cannot credibly inform a PL about a proposal's
location, its decision rule is as follows: (a) when the median PL
participant's condition for voting yes is satisfied, propose the Model
1 rule that is the study group's ideal point; (b) when the condition
is not satisfied, propose a Model 2 rule or no rule at all.
2. A PL with One Interest Group
a. Factors That Lead PL Participants to Update Beliefs About a
Proposal's Location
An interest group that may be affected by a proposal will wish
to participate in a study group in order to become informed and to
help shape events. If the study group creates a proposal that the
median PL participant would support under the uninformed
decision rule, however, the interest group will not lobby. There is
no need to incur lobbying costs for proposals that will pass anyway.
The discussion below thus assumes either that the interest group
dislikes the study group proposal, or that the PL would reject a
favored proposal unless the interest group persuaded the PL to vote
yes. The interest group is likely to lobby PL legislators in either of
these events because it may well be persuasive.
5 9
See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
59 The analysis in this section draws from Arthur Lupia & Matthew D. McCubbins,
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To see why, we retain all the assumptions that generated the
uninformed decision rule except (d): the median PL participant
now is assumed able to draw inferences about the location of a
study group's proposal on the basis of what interested parties say
and do. She uses these inferences to update her prior beliefs about
a proposal's location. The median PL participant uses three factors
to update her beliefs: (1) whether the proposal, called y, is costly
for the study group to make; (2) whether the PL can impose a
penalty for misrepresenting the location of y; and (3) whether
reports ofy's location are made by persons with preferences that are
similar to those of the median PL participant. We discuss each
factor in turn.
First, an interest group member incurs costs in helping to create
proposals. Interest group members thus will generate proposals
only if these would alter the status quo sufficiently to justify the
effort. Hence, if interest group members are observed to partici-
pate extensively in the affairs of a study group,6" the PL participant
knows that the resulting proposal is a nontrivial distance from sq.
This result is illustrated by Figure 4.
FIGURE 4
a p sq r x z
The median PL participant infers that the study group proposal is
either in the interval {a, p1 or {r, zi. A proposal would have to be
at least that far away from the status quo (sq) in order to justify the
costs of creating it.
The second factor leading the PL participant to update her
beliefs is the ability to impose a penalty on parties who misrepresent
a proposal's location. Study group members will represent the
location of a proposal to the PL. Moreover, reformers and interest
Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed, 1OJ.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 96 (1994).
o It is plausible to assume that the identity of study group members and advisors
is known to the PL because the PL leadership appoints the membership of these
groups, and because group members commonly appear before the PL to explain
proposals.
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group members who do not participate on a study group may lobby
the PL, and in doing so they will make representations as to the
location of proposals. Suppose that these persons will pay a penalty
for lying if they are found out. Then they either will tell the truth
or misrepresent sufficiently to justify the expected cost of the
penalty.
For example, recall our assumption that the median PL
participant's ideal point is to the right of the status quo. Now let a
player inform the PL that a particular proposal would be better for
the median participant than the status quo.61 The participant then
will infer that the proposal cannot lie in the interval fg, sql in
Figure 5.
FIGURE 5
I I I ,
a g sq x z
To see why, consider the possibilities. The speaker could be telling
the truth, in which case the proposal actually is better than the
status quo and, therefore, lies to the right of sq. On the other hand,
if the proposal is worse for the median PL participant than the
status quo (that is, to the left of sq), then the proposal must change
the status quo sufficiently to justify the lie. Hence, when there is a
reputational cost to lying, a player will falsely claim that a proposal
is better than the status quo only when it is considerably worse (that
is, in the interval {a, g}).
The third criterion that leads the PL participant to update her
beliefs concerning the location of any proposal is whether the
report comes from someone whose preferences are close to those
held by the median PL participant. Simply put, the more closely
another person's preferences resemble yours, the less incentive that
61 The consequences of a proposal may be difficult to state precisely. Hence, the
parties will make approximations. This fact can be captured by supposing that the
median PL participant interprets a message respecting the location of a proposal to
mean that the proposal is better (or worse) for her than the status quo.
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person has to mislead you.62 As a consequence, the probability that
the median PL participant will believe a study group member's or
another person's description of a proposal is a function of the
probability that the speaker has the same preferences as the median
PL participant. 3 If the speaker is known to have exactly the same
preferences, then the speaker's statement will be considered true.
In Figure 6, the speaker is believed to have the same ideal point as
the median PL participant and claims that a proposal is better for
the participant than the status quo. The participant thus believes
that the proposal is in the interval tsq, b} and will support it.'
FIGURE 6
a sq x b z
If the speaker is known to have preferences opposed to those of the
median participant, the participant probably will consider the
message "better" to be uninformative rather than untrue. The
proposal could have fallen anywhere in the large interval (a, z}
62 David Austen-Smith uses this criterion to help explain the relationship between
legislators, committees, and lobbyists. See generally David Austen-Smith, Information
and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes, 37 AM. J. POL. Sci. 799 (1993)
[hereinafter Austen-Smith, Information]; David Austen-Smith, Interested Experts and
Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals Under Open Rule, 5 GAMEs & ECON. BEHAv. 3 (1993).
Thomas Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel use the similarity of preferences criterion in
discussing committee/floor relationships. See Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel,
Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, 34 AM.J. POL. SCI. 531,
passim (1990); see also Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 59, at 106-09 (discussing whom
legislators are likely to believe); Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 53, at 19 ("When
information is not verifiable, the reliability of any report depends in part on the
degree of consonance between the objectives of the decisionmaker and those of the
interested party or parties.").
'6 Austen-Smith thus shows that "the closer are the lobbyist's preferences over
consequences [of legislation] to those of the House,... the more likelyit is that there
can be influential vote stage lobbying." Austen-Smith, Information, supra note 62, at
811.
'4 Again, a similar analysis can be made with respect to the message "worse" (than
the status quo).
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before the message and will be supposed to fall anywhere in that
interval after it.
65
b. The Relative Credibility of Interest Groups and Reformers
The three factors that lead the median PL participant to update
her beliefs as to a proposal's location imply that interest group
members can send more credible messages than reformers can.
Conventional analyses have assumed the contrary: that reformer
messages are more credible than interest group messages because
interest group members have a pecuniary interest in PL outcomes
while reformers are disinterested. Even on its own terms this
assumption is too broad. Reformers also may have pecuniary
interests: a professor who is known to have formulated a law can
earn substantial consulting income following the law's adoption.
But even when such economic concerns are set aside, reformers
remain less credible than interest group members.
' This last statement should be qualified. An interest group's message can be
illuminating to the PL even though its preferences differ from those of the median
PL participant, if these preferences also differ in a particular way from those of a
study group and if the PL also knows the study group's ideal point. This qualification
is illustrated in Figure 7, where i is the interest group's ideal point and a study
group's ideal point p lies to the right of b.
FIGURE 7
I I I I I I I
a i sq x r b p y z
The interest group and the median PL participant apparently have opposing
preferences because the interest group wants to deviate from the status quo to the
left while the median PL participant wants to deviate to the right (her ideal point is
x). Nevertheless, the interest group can send credible messages about a proposal's
location. The PL participant knows that the study group will not make a proposal
that is to the left of sq given its ideal point. With respect to proposals to the right,
the interest group will say "worse" (than the status quo) only if a proposal is to the
right of b (for example, y), and "better" if it is to the left (for example, r). These
messages are credible because the interest group and the PL have relevantly identical
preferences given the study group's ideal point; any proposal in the interval fsq, b)
makes them both better off than proposal y, and any proposal to the right of this
interval makes them both worse off. Knowing this, the study group will propose
Model 1 rules in the win set {sq, b). It is unnecessary to pursue other configurations
of ideal points and proposals to illustrate that it is the relevant similarity of the
message sender's preferences to those of the median PL participant that importantly
determines PL outcomes.
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People become reformers partly because they have strong policy
preferences. Some reformers will overstate or misrepresent a
proposal's consequences in order to implement those preferences.
Hence, the median PL participant has to choose which possibly
biased message to believe. Recalling the three criteria developed
above, participation in study groups is a net gain, not a cost, for
reformers. Consequently, the median PL participant cannot learn
much about the location of a proposal when reformers are observed
to play the major role in the proposal's creation, except that the
proposal is not at sq.
Further, reformers have a weaker incentive than interest group
members to tell the truth because they incur lower penalties from
lying. Interest groups and PLs play a repeated game. For example,
banks have been attempting to influence NCCUSL and ALI
outcomes for five decades. When parties play a repeated game,
early bad behavior leads to later sanctions. Thus, banks have a
strong incentive to tell the truth. In contrast, reformers and PLs
commonly play the game only once: few commercial law professors
have worked on more than one set of Article 4 revisions. Thus,
reformers who are discovered to have slanted a proposal's location
cannot be punished.
Finally, interest group member preferences commonly are
closer to those of the median PL participant than are reformer
preferences. Reformers are academics, who hold political views that
usually are to the left of the average citizen, and are considerably to
the left of the elite senior lawyers who constitute large majorities in
such PLs as NCCUSL, the ALl, and the ABA.6" Because PL
participants commonly assume that interest group members are
more likely than reformers to have similar preferences, participants
are more likely to believe an interest group member's statement
than a reformer's statement about the consequences of a proposal.
To summarize, interest group member statements are more
credible than reformer statements for three reasons: it is more
costly for an interest group member to participate in creating
proposals than it is for a reformer; the interest group member
incurs a greater penalty for lying; and the interest group member's
preferences commonly are doser to those of the median PL participant. 7
6 See LIPSET, supra note 51, at 10-12.
" There also is a pooling equilibrium in the model above in which the median PL
participant ignores all messages sent to her and the study group thus sends no
messages. This equilibrium seldom would survive the intuitive criterion. See DREw
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c. The Relative Influence of a Single Interest Group in a PL and in a
Typical Legislature
When only one interest group is active, it will have more power
in a PL than in a typical legislature because credibility is more
important to PL participants than it is to legislators. A typical
legislator can learn the location-the consequences-of a proposal in
two ways: she can receive messages from knowledgeable parties, or
she can hold a hearing. Holding a hearing is more reliable
(documents can be subpoenaed, witnesses sworn and cross-exam-
ined), but it is more expensive because hearings take time.
Listening to knowledgeable parties is cheaper, but is less reliable
because these informants may have an incentive to misrepresent the
truth. Thus, messages and hearings are substitutes in legislatures.
A sophisticated legislature will use both tools so as to maximize the
probability that it is well informed.
In contrast, a PL participant must rely only on messages.
Because most PL participants have no direct economic stake in
particular proposals, are not paid for time spent on PL business,
and are given no resources, they do not make personal investiga-
tions. Also, PLs lack the means, and in consequence the institution-
al structures, to hold hearings. Messages are more important to PL
participants than they are to ordinary legislators because messages
are the only source of information available to PL participants as to
the consequences of proposals.68 Therefore, the conclusion that
an interest group message commonly is more credible than a
reformer message implies that interest groups have more power in
PLs than in ordinary legislatures.
To see how this power is exercised, consider Figure 8.
FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 448-51, 453-54 (1993). In order to
understand this assertion, one must realize that an interest group would deviate from
the pooling equilibrium if it had preferences similar to those of the median
participant and if it would be disadvantaged by application of the uninformed
decision rule. This is because such an interest group wants to be recognized for what
it is-a group whose preferences are similar to those of the median participant and
that the PL can punish-because then its messages will be trustworthy. Thus the
interest group will deviate from the uninformative pooling equilibrium to send
credible messages.
' The Director of the ALI has said that an important criterion for appointment
to a study group is that the person have credibility with the ALI leadership. See supra
part I.A. This is consistent with the analysis here: credibility is important in a PL
because verifiability is not an option.
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FIGURE 8
I I I I I I
a sq r g x i b z
Suppose that an interest-group-dominated study group's ideal point
is in the interval {sq, b). The study group will propose a Model 1
rule in that interval and truthfully claim that the rule is better than
the status quo for the median PL participant.6 9 For the reasons
given, this claim is likely to be believed and the proposal will pass.
A reformer-dominated study group whose ideal point is in the
interval {sq, b) also would like to propose a Model I rule in that
interval. However, this study group's claim that the proposal is
better than the status quo for the median member is less credi-
ble.
70
This lack of credibility has two consequences. First, if an
affected interest group's ideal point is to the left of sq, the group
will lobby in opposition to any Model 1 rule in the interval [sq, b).
This opposition probably will kill the rule because the reformers will
not be believed. If reformers anticipate this, they will propose a
Model 2 rule instead. Second, reformers have an incentive to
propose Model 1 rules that the interest group likes, within limits.
To illustrate why, suppose (in Figure 8) that a reformer-dominated
study group's ideal point is r, which is equidistant between sq and
g, while the interest group's ideal point is at i. The interest group
would support any proposal to the right of sq. Thus, a reformer-
dominated study group will propose a Model 1 rule just to the left
of g. This rule will be better for the reformers than sq and will also
be acceptable to the interest group. With interest group lobbying
support, the rule has a good chance to pass (that is to say, true
statements by the interest group that the rule is better for the
median PL participant than the status quo are credible).
This analysis has three implications: (a) an interest-group-
dominated study group will get the Model 1 rules it likes if its
'9 Recall that b is as far from the median participant's ideal point x as is sq.
Hence, any proposal to the left of b and the right of sq is better for the median
participant than sq. Proposals to the right of b and the left of sq are further from the
median participant's ideal point than sq and are, therefore, worse for the participant.
70 See supra part II.D.2.b.
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preferences are reasonably close to the preferences of the median
PL participant (that is, in the interval tsq, bl); (b) an interest group
has a good chance to block a proposed Model 1 rule by a reformer-
dominated study group even though a well-informed PL would have
adopted the rule (the interest group would attempt to block if its
ideal point is to the left of sq); and (c) a reformer-dominated study
group will propose Model 1 rules that an interest group prefers if
both the reformers and the interest group hold preferences that are
relatively close to those of the median PL participant (that is, in the
interval {sq, bl). These three implications support our result that
interest groups have more power in PLs than in ordinary legisla-
tures (when there is only one active group). This result, in turn,
implies that reformers will make strong efforts to enlist interest
group members to support reform proposals or will try hard to
defuse interest group opposition. The reformers need interest
groups more than the interest groups need reformers.
7
1
We conclude this aspect of the analysis by considering the case
when a study group's ideal point is to the left of sq-that is, far from
the median PL participant's ideal point. In this asymmetric-
information world, an interest-group-dominated study group would:
(a) propose a Model 1 rule that is in the interval {a, sql and then lie
about its location, if it would gain enough from passage to justify
the possible reputational costs; or (b) propose a Model 2 rule or no
rule at all. Study groups lack this choice when information is
symmetric because then proposals that a PL dislikes always fail;
hence, these proposals are not made. A reformer-dominated study
group seldom would propose a Model 1 rule to the left of sq, even
though its ideal point lay there, because the reformers' false claim
that the proposal lay in the interval {sq, b) would not be believed.
7 Because the median PL participant learns little from reformers, an apparent
implication of the analysis is that when only reformers are active, they cannot achieve
anything: the participant will follow the uninformed decision rule, voting yes when
the rule directs and no otherwise. A more accurate conclusion, however, is that
reformers cannot achieve anything significant enough to attract public notice. The
PL participants' general preference for reform inclines them to support proposals
that cannot create negative reputational effects. Thus, when interest groups are
absent, successful NCCUSL and ALI proposals unsurprisingly tend to be innocuous
on their face. For example, a uniform law to compel the attendance of out-of-state
witnesses may, or may not, further the administration of justice, but the rule is
unlikely to embarrass the PL participants who voted for it. In short, reformers
sometimes can cause reforms to be adopted that no group could be mobilized to
oppose. Such reforms are commonly called "technical."
PRIVATE LEGISLATURES
Rather, because of the pro-reform bias that reformers have, such a
study group would propose a Model 2 rule instead.
3. PLs with Competing Interest Groups
In a world of asymmetric information, interest group power is
substantially diluted when groups compete. Further, the institution-
al bias of PLs to behave conservatively is reinforced. In explaining
these results, we retain the assumption that an interest group will
always participate in a study group if it can. 2 The analysis here
thus focuses on an interest group's decision whether to lobby PL
legislators when another group might lobby them also, and on the
effect of that decision.
To begin, assume that a study group proposes a Model 1 rule
that affects two interest groups. The two groups are competitive:
one group, Gq, prefers the status quo, while the other group, G1,
prefers the proposed rule. The groups decide simultaneously
whether to lobby; that is, each group makes its lobbying decision
without knowing what the other will do. This is a reasonable
assumption because many proposals are originated by reformers,
who then promulgate the reforms to potentially interested par-
ties.73 Interest groups thus commonly learn about the existence of
proposals at about the same time.74 Let the uninformed decision
rule direct the median PL participant to vote no to any Model 1 rule
proposal. Then G.q will not lobby unless G1 does, because if both do
nothing, the proposal fails.
5
If G, lobbies alone, the criteria of costly participation, penalty
for lying, and similar preferences imply that G1 might persuade the
median PL participant to support the proposal. The median
participant is persuaded to change her vote to yes with probability
q (0 <_ q <_ 1). The more credible G1 is, the higher q will be. G,
realizes returns (in present value terms) of r1 if the proposal passes.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
s See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 13, at 877.
74 See infra note 119 (describing the efforts of reformers to inform interest
groups). A more technical motivation for the simultaneous-move assumption is
articulated infra note 81.
75 Interest groups sometimes are not competitive in the strict sense that one
prefers the status quo while the other prefers reform. Both may prefer the status quo
to any reform, or both may prefer any reform to the status quo but, at the same time,
prefer different reform proposals. When interest groups have "similar" preferences,
in this sense, little generality is lost by assuming that there is only one group. Thus,
we focus here on the more important case-when groups compete.
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The expected value of lobbying for G1 thus is qr. and its lobbying
cost is c. Hence, GI's condition for entering to lobby is qr > c, or
q > (c/rI).
If Gq lobbies, it will block the proposal with certainty. When
interest groups send conflicting messages concerning a proposal's
location, the median PL participant infers that one of them is lying,
but does not know which one. Since she cannot investigate, her
best response is to act as if neither message had been sent. Thus,
she will reject the proposal because, we assume, the uninformed
decision rule directs her to do so. 76 Let rq be Gq's return from
preserving the status quo and let its lobbying cost also be c. Its gain
from lobbying is rq - c because it blocks the proposal with certainty.
The proposal, however, fails with probability (1 - q) if G,, does
nothing. Hence, its payoff from doing nothing is (1 - q)r,, + q(-r)
= r,,(1 - 2q). Gsq's condition for entry then is rq - c > r1qU( - 2q), or
q > (c/2r,1 ). It is easier to satisfy Gq's entry condition than GI's,
because if Gq enters it gets a positive payoff for certain, while if G1
enters it gets a positive payoff with probability q.
There are three unique equilibria in this model, two in pure
strategies and one in mixed strategies. 7 If G,'s entry condition is
6 Recall that a PL participant, unlike an ordinary legislator, cannot make an
independent investigation. This distinguishes the model used here from the model
presented by David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright. See David Austen-Smith &
John R. Wright, Competitive Lobbyingfor a Legislator's Vote, 9 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE
229, 232 (1992). In their model, the legislator learns the truth with certainty when
both groups lobby. She then knows that one group is lying- hence, she infers that her
uninformed decision how to vote may be wrong, and she will certainly investigate.
As a consequence, her threat to investigate if both groups lobby and send conflicting
messages is credible. Both groups are aware of this threat. Because there is a penalty
for lying, each group thus sends the same message when both lobby-the truth. See
id. at 233-45. In the model here, the PL legislator cannot check facts and so acts as
if no messages were sent when both groups lobby; that is, she votes as her
uninformed decision rule directs her to. When only one group enters, and the
legislator can verify messages at a cost, there may not be an equilibrium in pure
strategies: the group will tell the truth if the legislator checks; but the legislator then
will not check because the group will tell the truth; but then the group will lie; and
so forth. For an analysis of mixed strategy equilibria in this case, see Eric Rasmusen,
Lobbying When the Decisionmaker Can Acquire Independent Information, 77 PUB. CHOICE
899, 901-07 (1993). We need not explore these possibilities here.
" A strategy in a game is "a complete plan of action-it specifies a feasible action
for the player in every contingency in which the player might be called on to act."
ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 117 (1992). A Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies exists when each player's strategy is a best re-
sponse-that is, the utility maximizing response-to the strategies the other players
have chosen. In this event, no player has an incentive to change her strategy, so the
game is in equilibrium. To understand mixed strategies, suppose that a particular
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not satisfied, neither group lobbies and the proposal fails; if G1's
entry condition is satisfied but Gsq's entry condition is not, then G1
lobbies and the proposal passes with probability q." There are no
pure strategy equilibria in which both groups enter. This is because
G, wants to lobby only if Gq does not, while G,, wants to lobby only
if G1 does. 9 There also is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which
Gq enters with probability Pq = (qrl - c)/qr and G enters with
probability P, = (rSq - 2 qr,/(q - C).80
This equilibrium is reasonable. The entry probabilities imply
that G,, is more likely to lobby if G, has a good chance to persuade
the PL to vote yes; G1 would realize a large payoff from passage of
the proposal; and Gq's lobbying costs are low. The first two factors
increase the likelihood that G, will enter and so increase the payoff
to Gq from entering as well. The effect of the last factor is obvious.
More subtly, G, is less likely to lobby the better are its chances to
persuade the PL and the lower are its entry costs. These results
occur because the higher q is, and the lower c is, the more likely Gq
is to enter and block the proposal with certainty. At that point, GI's
lobbying costs would be wasted."'
player-player i-"has K pure strategies Si =[il . . . Is O [available to her]. Then a
mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution (Pi .... Pik), where Pik is the
probability that player i ... will play strategy sik, for k = 1 .... K." Id. at 31. A
mixed strategy equilibrium exists when each player's mixed strategy is a best response
to the mixed strategies of the other players. This means that no player has an
incentive to change the probability with which she plays particular pure strategies
given the probabilities of the other players. Game theorists interpret mixed strategies
in this way: player A actually prefers to play one of the pure strategies available to
her-say sL. The other players do not know just which pure strategy player A prefers
and so each believes that she plays particular pure strategies with probability p,,.
When the beliefs that each player holds about the others are consistent-when no
player has an incentive to revise her probability assignments-a mixed strategy
equilibrium exists in the game.
"' See Austen-Smith & Wright, supra note 76, at 230 (indicating that interest
groups will lobby legislators who disagree with them). For data consistent with this
prediction, see David Austen-Smith &John R. Wright, Counteractive Lobbying, 38 AM.
J. POL. Sci. 25, 25-26 (1994).
7 9 The result that there is no joint-entry pure strategy equilibrium is established
in the Appendix.
o This equilibrium also is established in the Appendix.
s The particular results change (but not the general ones) if the median PL
participant's uninformed decision rule would induce the PL to support a proposed
Model 1 rule. Then G1 would not lobby unless G,q lobbied, because the proposal
would pass were no lobbyists to appear. G, thus has an incentive to lobby if G
lobbies, because then there will be competing messages that cancel and the PL will
use its uninformed decision rule to vote yes. However, there is no pure strategy
equilibrium in which both enter. With respect to the assumption that lobbying
1995]
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Two additional implications of the model are significant. First,
when the stakes involved in reform are high, an interest group may
have less lobbying power before a PL than it would have before an
ordinary legislature; and second, PLs will behave more conservative-
ly. To understand the first implication, suppose that a proposed
Model 1 rule would work a substantial reform. In the usual case,
this would impose substantial costs on persons who prefer the status
quo; that is, rq would be high. In consequence, G,q's entry condition
becomes easy to satisfy, so the PL is more likely to observe
competing messages. Because these messages cancel, the PL will
apply the uninformed decision rule. Thus, when a proposed Model
1 rule would substantially deviate from the status quo and affect
more than one interest group, the PL is likely to act as if no
lobbying had occurred. The more significant the issue, in short, the
less power competing interest groups have.
The second implication-that PLs will behave more conservative-
ly when interest groups compete-follows from the first. If a
proposal would change the status quo substantially and affect only
one interest group, that group may cause the PL to change its vote
to yes. Major reform proposals, however, tend to create winners
and losers; that is, they will engender competitive lobbying. In this
event, as we have just stated, the PL would ignore the groups'
messages in favor of using its uninformed decision rule. This
strategy, much more often than not, would induce the PL to choose
the status quo. PLs such as NCCUSL and the ALI thus react more
conservatively to proposals that would work significant reform than
to proposals that would alter the status quo only slightly.
8 2
decisions are made simultaneously, G, has an incentive to delay its lobbying decision
as long as possible (if the uninformed decision rule directs a no vote). This is because
if GI entered early, G, would observe its entrance and thus enter to block its proposal
(if G,,'s entry condition is satisfied). In contrast, G, might force G, to make its entry
decision simultaneously (that is, late in the game) if GI waited. This is to GI's
advantage: when GI's and G,,'s entry conditions both are satisfied, and both must
decide whether to lobby at the same time, G. enters only probabilistically, while ifG,
entered early and alone, G,, would enter and block G,'s proposal with certainty.
Thus, a second motivation for treating lobbying as a simultaneous-move game is that
interest groups often have an incentive to force each other to play that game.
' The conservative bias of PLs also implies that a PL is more likely to approve
Model-i-type revisions of an existing statute or uniform law than to adopt a Model
1 rule covering a previously untreated area. Revisions of existing statutes are seen
as "technical" exercises-correcting minor flaws or updating a statute. From this it
follows that revisions are less likely to engender competitive lobbying than other
proposals presented to the PL, cet. par. See Scott, supra note 28, at 1820 (arguing
that, for these reasons, a single active interest group will have greater influence on
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Conservatism commonly means that a legislature will adopt no new
rules at all. Conservatism can take this form in PLs, but also can
result in the adoption of vague rules that appear to accomplish
something, but in fact do not.
We can summarize the models' principal results in three
propositions:
Proposition 1: A PL will produce many Model 2 rules. The
penchant to produce these rules exists when all of the actors before
a PL are symmetrically informed about the consequences of
proposals. It is reinforced by the more realistic assumptions that
information is asymmetric and that competing interest groups can
arise. Model 2 rules are not chosen just when and because the PL
is committed to the virtues that flow from stating rules in abstract
fashion; rather, the penchant of PLs to adopt vague rules is a
function of the political configuration of the relevant actors and the
PL's institutional structure.
Proposition 2: Interest groups may have a larger or smaller
influence on PL outcomes than they have on ordinary legislative
outcomes. When voters in the PL itself are poorly informed, a
dominant interest group will have power because it is best able to
make credible representations about the consequences of proposals.
This influence will result in many Model 1 rules. Again, these rules
are not chosen just when and because the PL is committed to the
virtues of precision in rule statement. Rather, the choice-of-rule
form reflects the relevant actors' political power. On the other
hand, when interest groups compete, the messages they send will be
too noisy to influence PL outcomes.
Proposition 3: PLs have a status quo bias that induces them to
reject reforms that any cohesive interest group would oppose.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF ALI AND NCCUSL PROJECTS
(WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON
COMMERCIAL LAW)
The ALI and NCCUSL consider the Uniform Commercial Code
to be their major success. The UCC is the most influential and
widely adopted uniform law. There has been little rigorous data
collection with respect to the results developed above, but much is
known about the composition of the study groups that created the
the revision process in securing adoption of bright-line rules that advance the group's
interests).
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UCC and that are active in revising it. Much is also known about
the participation of interest groups in the Code-creation process.
Also, the results of that process-the character and specificity of
UCC rules-are observable. There is also considerable evidence of
this character with respect to other recent ALl and NCCUSL
projects. We summarize much of this evidence below.8 s Before
doing so, we develop two predictions concerning the character and
rule form of the UCC itself: (a) Article 9 and its current revision,
and Articles 3 and 4 and their recent revisions, will contain many
Model 1 rules, while Article 2 and its current revision will contain
many Model 2 rules; and (b) the Code's Model 1 rules will be the
product of industry influence.
A. Article 9
There was extensive interest group participation, largely by
asset-based financers and banks, in the drafting of Article 9. The
principal reporter of the Article 9 project, Grant Gilmore, reported
on the events that led banks and finance companies to support the
UCC project that they had earlier rejected as a radical reform.
8 4
This support developed after Homer Kripke, then a legal counsel to
CIT Financial Corp., became one of the key advisors to Gilmore and
the other drafters.8 5 Kripke subsequently described how, during
their drafting deliberations, banking interests blocked proposed
clauses that would have imposed on them the costs of various
consumer-protection provisions.8 6 Kripke reported that it was
83 We test our theory primarily by retrodiction-the ability of a theory to predict
prior events: here, the shape of the UCC. Steven Weinberg recently emphasized the
value of this method:
It is widely supposed that the true test of a theory is in the comparison
of its predictions with the results of experiment. Yet .... in the case of
general relativity a retrodiction, the calculation of the already-known
anomalous motion of Mercury, in fact provided a more reliable test of the
theory than a true prediction of a new effect, the deflection of light by
gravitational fields.
. Often it is a successful prediction that one should really distrust. In
the case of a true prediction.... the experimentalist does know about the
theoretical result when he does the experiment. And that can lead, and
historically has led, to as many wrong turns as overreliance on successful
retrodictions.
STEVEN WEINBERG, DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY 96, 97 (1992).
84 See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 86 (1977).
" See Grant Gilmore, Dedication to Professor Homer Kripke, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9,
11(1981).
' See Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform
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necessary to avoid arousing the opposition of banks and finance
companies in order to ensure passage of the UCC project."7 Thus,
the original Article 9 was the creation of an "interest-group-
dominated study group."
We predict that such a study group will propose Model 1 rules
that are in its interest. In a world of symmetric information, the
interest group will participate on a study group only if it can get its
way because participation is costly. In a world of asymmetric
information, the study group will also propose Model 1 rules if its
ideal point is relatively close to that of the median PL participant
and if, because it is the only group, its messages concerning the
location of proposals will be credible. The impressionistic evidence
suggests that these conditions were met in the original Article 9
project.
The business lawyers who served on the Article 9 study group
had preferences concerning the regulation of commercial practice
that appeared to be close to the preferences of the business lawyers
who then dominated the ALI and NCCUSL."9 Further, Article 9
largely affects finance companies and banks, parties whose interests
concerning the regulation of asset-based financing coincide in many
(if not most) respects.90 Moreover, Article 9 affects no other
cohesive interest group.
91
The conditions that lead us to suppose that the original Article
9 study group would propose business-oriented Model 1 rules also
leads us to predict that those rules would be adopted. This
prediction seems confirmed in the original Article 9 statutory
scheme. Article 9 explicitly "purports to promote the interests of
those industries that helped create and lobby for it. Not only does
[Article 9] seek to lower the costs of asset-based financing, but the
statute also creates rules (such as repossession) that many believe
disadvantage consumer debtors."92 In addition, the original Article
9 did not regulate railroad car trusts and insurance in order to
diffuse opposition from the railroad and insurance industries.
9 3
Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L. F. 321, 323-24.
8 7 See id. at 322, 326-27.
8 See Scott, supra note 28, at 1822-24 (providing further impressionistic support
for the conclusion that the original Article 9 project was subject to interest group
influence).
9 See id. at 1822-23 & n.116.
90 See id. at 1806-07.
91 See id.
'2 Id. at 1823-24 (footnote omitted).
9 See Fairfax Leary, Reflections of a Drafter. Fairfax Leary, 43 OHIO ST. LJ. 557,
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It is relevant to ask whether the forces that produced the
original statute are likely to affect the current Article 9 revisions.
An impressionistic examination of the Article 9 Study Group that
recently completed its Final Report strongly suggests the presence
of industry influence. The Group was comprised of two academic
reporters and sixteen members-three legal academics and thirteen
practicing lawyers, the largest number of whom were in-house
counsel for banks and finance companies or private attorneys
representing secured financing interests.94 The Article 9 Study
Group defined its task as the resolution of "technical" problems that
are susceptible to legal expertise rather than the undertaking of
possibly controversial reformf.5 As a consequence of this focus,
the principal currency in Study Group discussions was technical
expertise; "how the rules 'really work' in practice."" The privi-
leged status of hands-on working knowledge of Article 9 rules thus
gave the in-house counsel and the private commercial lawyers the
power to determine what the Study Group did.97 Efforts by the
academic members-that is, the reformers-to place significant
reform proposals on the agenda were uniformly unsuccessful."8
557-58 (1982).
' See Scott, supra note 28, at 1807.
9- See id. at 1808.
96 Id.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 1809. Donald Rapson, Vice President and Assistant General Counsel
of the CIT Group, Inc., and a participant in the Article 9 revision process, provides
further evidence of the role of interest groups at the level of the study group. In
describing the general UCC revision process, he says:
The question, however, is whether the "environment" of the drafting
committee process inhibits drafting fair and efficient statutory rules that
advance the public interest .... I fear that the process makes that very
difficult to do....
NCCUSL's procedures require that drafting committee meetings be
open and participatory to all. As a consequence, representatives from
interest groups are encouraged to and indeed unhesitatingly do make
known their views and positions. From time to time, the chairperson of the
drafting committee even asks for nonbindingvotes of the entire assemblage
in order to see if there is a reaction to or a consensus on a particular issue.
That vote obviously reflects the number of attendees from the respective
interest groups-usually the banking groups have the highest number of
attendees.
Recognizing that reality, the chairperson will then ask the drafting
committee to vote-alone but publicly-a vote that often determines how the
draft will come out on a particular question. Although the individual
members of the drafting committee are supposed ... to vote their own
consciences independently of their personal affiliations, the fact remains
PRIVATE LEGISLATURES
This description of the revision process leads us to predict what
is observable on the face of the Article 9 Study Group's report: (1)
the Study Group recommends many reform proposals; (2) these pro-
posals are overwhelmingly framed as Model 1 rules; and (3) the
Model 1 rules are facially congruent with industry preferences.
99
When one interest group is active in a PL, it often can block
proposals it dislikes and secure passage of proposals it wants. Banks
and secured financiers commonly have similar interests and seldom
are opposed in the ALl and NCCUSL by competing groups. Thus,
we also predict that the ALI and NCCUSL will adopt the Article 9
Study Group's revisions without significant amendment.0
Further evidence from other business-law projects also supports
the prediction that a cohesive interest group can (and does) block
proposals that only have reformer support. For example, NCCUSL
directed a drafting committee to create a proposed uniform-
payments law, and the principal proponent behind the proposal was
a law professor from Harvard. The banks disliked the law and
that their statements and votes are publicly made in the glare of the interest
groups. To some, that may be somewhat daunting and intimidating.
Drafting committee members whose practice, employment, or academic
consulting is for or on behalf of an interest group may be hard pressed to
take an action contrary to that group.
Rapson, supra note 21, at 263-64. Rapson says that the pressures he describes
affected the Article 9 revision process. See id. at 264, 259-60.
" See id. at 1822-47 (analyzing the 36 specific areas in the Final Report, each of
which contains numerous proposals to amend either the statutory language or the
official comments to Article 9). This analysis shows that many of the key revisions are
framed as bright-line or Model 1 rules; these rules appear on their face to promote
the interests of specific classes of secured creditors in contexts where competing
interests may well be disadvantaged; and these effects are designed to be hidden from
public view behind cosmetic efforts to maintain the efficacy of the filing system. See
id.
0 The banks' power in NCCUSL apparently has not diminished with the years.
For example, a recent NCCUSL president wrote:
At its annual meeting in 1990 the Conference approved two new uniform
acts and one model act.., and a revised version of the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act. The only controversy was over that section of the [Uniform
Controlled Substances Act] dealingwith forfeiture, to which it appeared that
banks and other holders of security interests objected. Accordingly, that
section was deleted and referred to a special committee for further study,
the remainder of the act being approved.
WALTER P. ARMSTRONG,JR., A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 126 (1991) (emphasis added); see also
infra note 105 (providing additional authorities).
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NCCUSL did not enact it.' A second example is drawn from
corporate law. State courts apply the business judgment rule when
reviewing the conduct of target directors in responding to hostile
takeover bids.10 2 This rule confers a large amount of discretion
on the directors, which they frequently exercise in attempting to
preserve target independence. An academic consensus holds that
directors should be less free to block bids. The academic reporters
for the ALI Corporate Governance Project, whose charge was to
develop rules for directors, thus tried to restrict director discretion.
These reformers were opposed by a cohesive group of corporate
counsel and the companies who employed them.' The ALI
ultimately adopted a vague rule that permitted directors and state
courts to do what they had previously been doing.
0 4
101 This history is described in Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting
Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising Articles 3 and 4, 26 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 743 (1993), and in Patchel, supra note 5, at 101-10.
102 See e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
180, 185 (Del. 1986) (holding that the directors in this case were not entitled to the
deference accorded by the business judgment rule).
10 The history of attempts to influence the ALI Corporate Governance Project is
told in Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance
Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1044-52 (1993), and Jonathan R. Macey, The
Transformation of the American Law Institute, 61 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 1212, 1228-32
(1993). Professor Bainbridge states: "The ALI prides itself on being, in the words
of its President, 'analytical and impartial.' In fact, the process by which the Principles
took shape most closely resembled the rough-and-tumble politics of a state
legislature." Bainbridge, supra, at 1044 (footnotes omitted). Professor Bainbridge
concludes that "[ifn sum, self-interest is critical to understanding how the Principles
took their final form." Id. at 1052.
104 Section 6.02 of the Principles of Corporate Governance provides that a target
board "may take an action that has the foreseeable effect of blocking an unsolicited
tender offer.., if the action is a reasonable response to the offer." With respect to
whether a board's action is reasonable, "[t]he board may take into account all factors
relevant to the best interests of the corporation and shareholders, including, among
other things.... whether the offer, if successful, would threaten the corporation's
essential economic prospects." The section also authorizes a board to "have regard
for groups (other than shareholders) with respect to which the corporation has a
legitimate concern," but does not attach a weight to this factor. None of the
imprecise terms in this section are defined. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.02 (1994).
Professor Carney said of the entire enterprise: "The Corporate Governance
Project can be characterized as expanding the role of fiduciary duties of various
participants in firms and as expanding the number of open terms in the corporate
contract that only courts can clarify." William J. Carney, The ALI's Corporate
Governance Project: The Death of Property Rights?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 898, 899
(1993).
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B. Articles 3 and 4
The same influences that affected the creation and revision of
Article 9 affected Articles 3 and 4. The latter Articles affect banks,
but no other cohesive interest group, and bank lawyers played a
large role in the original drafting process." 5 These lawyers'
preferences also appeared to lie close to those of the business
lawyers in NCCUSL and the ALV.°8 Thus, we predict that Articles
3 and 4 would contain many Model 1 rules and would be "bankers'
legislation." The former prediction is confirmed on the face of the
statute; the latter prediction apparently is a consensus view. 7
Because the political situation has not changed since the original
UCC,1°8 we would also expect that the recently revised Articles 3
and 4 would resemble the original in relevant respects.
Impressionistic reports from participants in the Article 3 and 4
revision process are consistent with the prediction that these study
groups were industry dominated." 9 Both revisions have passed
105 Homer Kripke, a leader in the creation of Articles 3 and 4, said that the
drafters "originally sought to put heavy responsibilities on the banks and to limit
contractual exoneration from liability. Bank counsel opposed the staff's drafts
vigorously.... [A] draft acceptable to bank counsel ultimately became part of the
Code." Kripke, supra note 86, at 326-27. Kripke added, concerning the Code in
general, that "the final result gave greater weight to the practicing lawyers, than to
the staff's viewpoints." Id. at 327. Extensive evidence supporting Kripke's history is
cited in Patchel, supra note 5, at 101-10; see also Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and
the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4,42 ALA. L. REV. 551,554-55 (1991) (describing
how during the original drafting of Article 3, bankers exerted pressure on the drafters
to shift liability to customers in certain places and how Karl Llewellyn fired a reporter
of a tentative draft of Article 4 who had proposed an antibank statute).
'06 See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
... The conventional view concerningArticles 3 and 4 holds that"[b]oth the N.I.L.
and the U.C.C. were drafted in the interests of and enacted under the influence of
the representatives of financial institutions." M.B.W. Sinclair, Codification of Negotiable
Instruments Law: A Tale of Reiterated Anachronism, 21 U. TOL L. REv. 625, 681 (1990);
see also Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer
Payments, 66 TEX. L. REv. 63, 112 (1987) (discussing rules for allocation of losses
resulting from fraud, forgery, and error between consumers and financial institu-
tions); Kripke, supra note 86 at 326-27 ("The drafting staff originally sought to put
heavy responsibilities on the banks .... Bank counsel opposed the staff's drafts
vigorously. At one point the matter seemed likely to be settled by dropping article
4 from the Code, but a draft acceptable to bank counsel ultimately became part of
the Code."); Edward L. Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation, and the Federalization of State
Law: Some Lessons from the Payment System, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1256 n.34, 1274-76
(1989) (detailing the influence of bankers on the UCC).
... Specifically, there is still only one interest group. See supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
'o
6 See Rubin, supra note 101, at 749 (detailing industry influence during the
deliberations of the ABA committee reviewing the revisions to Articles 3 and 4).
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the ALI and NCCUSL, and both have been enacted into law in most
states. An overwhelming majority of the new Article 3 and 4
provisions are in the form of Model 1 rules. Moreover, the new
proposals are facially congruent with industry interests. These
results are consistent with our prediction that when one interest
group is active, a PL will produce Model 1 rules that are in the
group's interest.
A legislature or administrative agency that regulates in an
industry's interest is said to be captured. A lawmaker is captured
when it chooses "a policy which would not be ratified by an
informed polity free of organization costs.""' This counterfactual
is difficult to test. Articles 3, 4, and 9 are widely thought to be
industry products, but this perception does not answer the question
whether "an informed polity" would consider them in the public
interest. There are reasons to believe that it would not.
To understand these reasons, recall that there was no consumer
protection movement when the original UCC was written. Hence,
only financial institutions were interested in the original Articles 3,
4, and 9. If these Articles partly reflected capture, much in them
would be overruled if their subject matters became part of the
public agenda. This happened. When consumer protection issues
came to public consciousness in the 1960s, important areas were
removed from the Code's jurisdiction. The Truth in Lending Law,
the Magnuson-Moss Act, the Consumer Product Safety Act, other
statutes, and Federal Trade Commission regulations substantially
altered or overruled UCC rules.' As two of many examples,
Article 3 permits the holder in due course defense in consumer
sales, which can severely disadvantage consumers, and Article 9
permits creditors to take blanket security interests in consumers'
personal property. The FTC bars the defense and prohibits the
security interests."' Thus, our results show that, when one domi-
11 Michael Levine &Jennifer Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 167, 178 (1990).
Under this definition, a law can reflect capture although it directs an efficient
outcome.
i See Scott, supra note 28, at 1823-24.
1
12 The former reform, codified in 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1988), probably was efficient,
but the latter is not. See Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor
Remedies, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 730, 746-50, 756-60 (1989) (discussing the structure of
the bargain between consumer debtors and creditors). The latter reform was codified
as an FTC rule. See Alan Schwartz, The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer
Goods, 26 J.L. & ECON. 117 (1983) (arguing that restricting the taking of security
interests in consumer goods is inefficient and not consistent with property theory);
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nant interest group participates in the PL law-creation process, PLs
are relatively easy to capture.
C. The Proposed Revisions to Article 2
In contrast to the analysis above, we predict that the original
Article 2, as well as the current revisions, will contain many Model
2 rules. The effects of sales law do not fall systematically on any
interest group-businesses and consumers are both buyers and
sellers. Also, business parties conveniently can contract out of sales
law rules that they dislike. Thus, sales law revisions will initially be
proposed by reformer-dominated study groups; reformers are the
only people interested enough to put in the time to alter the status
quo. 113
Moreover, the ideal points of the reformers such as Karl
Llewellyn, who drafted Article 2, were far from the ideal points of
the ALI and NGCUSL members considering the UCC project,
especially concerning such key issues as the appropriate scope of
freedom of contract. Indeed, in the campaign to pass the UCC in
the 1960s, William Schnader, a strong proponent of the Code, was
hesitant to incorporate amendments suggested by the academic
reformers because they represented views so far from the rank and
file of the ALI and NCCUSL membership.1 4  When reformers
dominate a study group and have ideal points that lie far from the
ideal point of the median PL participant, we predict that the PL will
adopt a large number of Model 2 rules whether information is
symmetric or not.
There is an additional reason why Article 2 will have more vague
rules than Articles 8, 4, and 9. Model 2 rules sometimes impose
Alan Schwartz, Optimality and the Cutoff of Defenses Against Financiers of Consumer Sales,
15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 499, 502 (1974) (arguing for a change in law to allow
"credit buyers to interpose sales defenses against financiers"). For a more extensive
discussion of the effect of the consumer protection movement on Article 9, see Scott,
supra note 28, at 1822-47.
is A law professor, Karl Llewellyn, created the earliest version of Article 2 and
was primarily responsible for having the ALI consider it. See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 270-340 (1973).
14 See A Look at the Work of the Article 9 Review Committee: A Panel Discussion, 26
Bus. LAW. 307,307 (1970) ("[Schnader] particularly resisted academic suggestions for
amendment. On the other hand, he was quite sympathetic with people who were
suggesting amendments, where there were people who had the power to keep the
Code from getting enactment. (Laughter)") (statement by Professor Robert
Brauchner); see also Scott, supra note 28, at 1785.
646 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143:595
high compliance costs relative to Model I rules because it is difficult
to know what a Model 2 rule requires. Interest groups sometimes
can block the enactment of rules that would impose high compli-
ance costs. The tack is to persuade uninvolved PL participants that
passage of such a vague rule would adversely affect their reputation.
A large majority of these participants will not derive direct econom-
ic benefits from the passage of any one proposal, nor do Model 2
rules produce results specific enough to advance a participant's
policy preferences. Under these circumstances, an interest group
sometimes can argue credibly that a particular Model 2 rule will
create excessive uncertainty, so that support for the rule would be
perceived as inconsistent with having good judgment. Such an
argument is likely to be advanced in deliberations over Articles 3,
4, and 9, where cohesive interest groups dominate, but it is unlikely
to be advanced in connection with Article 2 because the costs and
benefits of sales law Model 2 rules are spread widely and shallowly.
Hence, no group has an incentive to lobby in order to block them.
Article 2, therefore, is more likely than Articles 3, 4, and 9 to have
Model 2 rules.
The study group to revise Article 2 seems reformer-dominated.
So far as it appears, no commercial interest group has lobbied to
change the statute. Because academics were and are in charge, we
predict that both the original Article 2 and the revisions will contain
many vague rules. The former prediction is confirmed on the face
of the statute. Almost everyone who has studied the subject agrees
that the original Article 2 has many Model 2 rules.
A salient example of the continuing predominance of Model 2
rules in sales law can be found in the Article 2 Drafting Committee's
approach to the issues of contract formation and enforceability.
According to the Reporter of the Drafting Committee, the Commit-
tee "has preserved the original approach to contract formation and
modification attributable to Karl N. Llewellyn.... This approach
minimizes formality, but when necessary, expands rather than limits
the opportunity to contract. The emphasis is uponflexible standards,
mutual conduct, and the intention of the parties."15 Specific examples
of the Model 2 rules that follow from this "emphasis" include
proposals to repeal the Statute of Frauds requirement of section 2-
201,116 to revise section 2-204(3) so as to link contractual obliga-
"' Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formation and Modification Under Revised Article 2,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1305, 1311 (1994) (emphasis added).
116 See id. at 1315.
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tion primarily to the existence of "a reasonably certain basis for
giving an appropriate remedy,"' and the following proposed
revision to section 2-207:
Varying terms contained in the writings and other records of the parties
do not become part of a contract unless the party claiming
inclusion proves that the party against whom they operate (i)
expressly agreed to such terms, or (ii) assented to such terms and had
notice of themfrom trade usage, prior course of dealing or course ofperfor-
mance. Except between merchants, the burden of proof under this
subsection is satisfied by clear and convincing evidence."
8
We also predict that reformer-dominated study groups will
attempt to enlist interest group support and diffuse interest group
opposition. The only groups that were possibly cohesive enough for
the reformers to consider in connection with the Article 2 revisions
were those that represented consumers. Representatives of
consumer groups have.been included in the drafting process.
19
11 7 U.C.C. § 2-204(c) (Discussion Draft 1993).
"' Id. § 2-20 7(c).
'19 See e.g., Fred H. Miller, Consumer Issues and the Revision of U.C.C. Article 2, 35
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1565 (1978). Miller states that:
The revision ofArticle 2, however, is blessed with not only a new concentra-
tion on consumer issues because of... past difficulties but additionally
involves persons on the Drafting Committee with considerable consumer law
experience and several advisors or observers that represent consumer
interests in their work. To date, this has given rise to strong discussion and
a much improved atmosphere for reaching consensus.
Id. at 1573 n.33, Evidence of attempts by reformers to diffuse industry opposition
can be seen in other NCCUSL projects. On occasion, industry groups themselves may
not know that NCCUSL is drafting a proposed uniform law. In this circumstance,
NCCUSL representatives seek interest groups out in order to diffuse opposition and
enlist support. Two academic reporters, one a commissioner, thus wrote:
The tradition is to reach out to groups that are likely to take an interest in
a proposed uniform act, and to secure the participation of such groups in
an advisory capacity throughout the drafting process. The ideal is to
identify relevant interests and to satisfy their concerns to the extent possible
in order to have a legislative product that takes account of the real problems
and that does not beget needless opposition ....
... Because the article VI revisions [of a gratuitous transfer law]
touched the interests of a variety of financial intermediaries in the banking,
mutual fund, and stock transfer industries, extensive efforts were made to
notify the industry associations and to secure their participation.
Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 13, at 877; see also Miller et al., supra note 12, at
1450 ("[M]embers [of the drafting committee] are selected to achieve a breadth of
experience and perspective."); Peter Winship, Lawmaking and Article 6 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 41 ALA. L. REV. 673, 683 n.33, 684 n.35 (1990) (listing the numerous
organizations that appointed representative advisors to the drafting committee). The
UCC Article 6 Study Group also described its goal as follows: "The Committee hoped
648 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 595
D. Retaining the Status Quo: The Effects of
Interest Group Competition
We predict that when interest groups compete, a PL is likely to
retain the status quo. We give three examples here. The first
involves the attempt to revise UCC Article 6, regulating bulk sales.
The attempt ended in failure. Three interest groups competed: the
unsecured lenders, represented by the Credit Men's Association,
wanted a strong law; 2 ' the secured lenders wanted to be exempt
from any law or to have no law at all;.2 ' and the auctioneers,
represented by the Association of United Auctioneers, wanted to
escape liability for their participation in sales of debtors' es-
tates. 2 2 NCCUSL could neither unite behind a serious revision
of Article 6 nor repeal it. Either alternative would have changed the
status quo substantially. Instead, NCCUSL recommended that each
state be given the option of repealing its version of Article 6 or
adopting a revised version, a power that the states already pos-
sessed. 123
Our second example concerns products liability and medical
malpractice law. The scope of a firm's liability for defective
products and of a doctor's liability when patients are injured have
been among the most debated and significant issues in American
private law since the 1970s. The issues are important, and strong
interest groups take different sides concerning them. For example,
the trial lawyers prefer the status quo while the insurance industry
wants substantial reform. This conflict implies, under the analysis
to create a Revised Article 6 which answered some fundamental criticisms and which
could be supported by the various interested groups from the bar and credit
industry." NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
REVISED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 6-BuLK SALES 1 (Draft for Discussion
Only 1986).
120 See Winship, supra note 119, at 688-89.
121 See id. at 690.
12 See id.
12' The story of the Article 6 revisions is told in Steven L. Harris, The Article 6
Drafting Committee's New Approach to Asset Acquisitions, 42 BuS. LAW. 1261 (1987);
William D. Hawkland, Proposed Revisions to U.C.C. Article 6,38 Bus. LAW. 1729 (1983);
and Winship, supra note 119.
When they cannot make a policy choice, the ALI and NCCUSL sometimes pass
menus that do not restrict state discretion rather than vague rules. For example,
when the original UCC was written, an important question was whether a consumer
who was injured by a defective product could sue the manufacturer directly or
whether she was restricted to a suit against the retailer. The original UCC § 2-318
offered the states a choice of three governing provisions, which spanned the positions
courts and commentators had taken. These alternatives thus achieved nothing.
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here, that the ALI will adopt vague rules or none at all. In 1986,
the ALI council commissioned a serious study of products liability,
environmental liability, and medical malpractice law with the goal
of developing principles that would be the basis of ALI action. In
1991, its study group produced a large number of principles, some
of them controversial.'24 The ALI has taken no action on the
basis of any of these principles. Instead, it commissioned a
Restatement of Products Liability Law. Because restatements are
directed to courts, this choice precluded significant reforms such as
using administration compensation schemes or scheduling damage
awards.
The nature and progress of the Products Liability Restatement
constitute our third example of PL performance when issues are
controversial. The ALI appointed two academic reporters to draft
the Restatement.'25 We predict that a reformer-dominated study
group will propose vague rules when its ideal point lies far from
that of the median PL participant. The writings of the reporters
reveal them to hold views on products liability reform that seem far
from the likely preferences of many ALI members.1
26
As an illustration of what has happened, perhaps the most
controversial area of products liability law involves design defects.
The substantive issue concerns when a product that performs as
intended is nevertheless defective because a different design could
have produced more safety. Resolving this issue requires a jury to
make difficult tradeoffs between reducing accident costs and
reducing the amenities a product can produce (a completely safe car
is little fun to drive and would be quite expensive). The difficulty
of these tradeoffs, especially when made in the context of litigation
by lay persons, has caused considerable unpredictability in applica-
tion of the law. In brief, it is difficult to predict when a jury will
find a design defective.1
27
The reporters' first draft responded to this problem by provid-
ing that "a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks
124 See generally ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY (Reporters'
Study 1991).
125 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY at v (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1994) (listingJames Henderson and Aaron Twerski as the reporters).
126 See generally JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS (2d ed. 1992).
127 See Alan Schwartz, Proposals forProducts Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis,
97 YALE L.J. 353, 384-92 (1988) (discussing the various design-defect tests that can
lead to different jury decisions).
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of harm posed by the product could have been reduced by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design... and the omission of
the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe." 28
Our analysis predicts that reformers will propose such Model 2 rules
when the Model 1 rules they like will not be adopted. We do not
predict that a PL will enact any particular Model 2 rule. A strong
enough status quo bias can induce rejection even of apparently
innocuous proposals. The ALI recently announced that it could not
complete its review of this "controversial" restatement and referred
the draft to the reporters for subsequent reconsideration and
resubmission. 129  In fact, the ALI has not adopted a proposal
concerning Products Liability Law since 1964.
CONCLUSION
Private law-making groups such as the ALI and NCCUSL have
not received serious scrutiny. This is because their members are
widely believed to be disinterested experts when they act on behalf
of the group. This conventional view has led to a disjunction in
academic commentary: ALI and NCCUSL products sometimes
receive severe criticism while ALI and NCCUSL procedures are
ignored."' This disjunction is unfortunate because the proce-
dures largely determine the products. In particular, theory suggests
12
8 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 125, § 2(b).
" Revised Article 8 Approved; Decisions Deferred on Products Liability and Malpractice
Drafts, 16 A.L.I. REP., Summer 1994, at 1, 6. After the reporters made "a number of
significant changes," the restatement was scheduled for a formal vote. Council Reviews
Three Drafts at OctoberMeeting, 17 A.L.I. REP., Fall 1994, at 1. Another example of the
penchant of study groups to propose vague rules to govern controversial matters
concerns the appropriate role of the causation requirement, one of the most heated
issues in tort and products liability law in recent years. The scope and some of the
passion of this debate are illustrated in Symposium, Causation in the Law of Torts, 63
CHi.-KENT L. REV. 397 (1987). Section 5 of the Tentative Draft No. 1, concerning
causation, provides "[w]hether a product defect caused harm is determined by the
prevailing rules and principles governing causation in tort." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 125, § 5.
"' The focus on product rather than process has a long history. Thus, prominent
scholars criticized the original restatements on the ground that these documents
contained many vague rules that did not resolve the problems at issue; but the
commentators did not trace this defect to the ALI's structure. See Charles E. Clark,
The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 643, 654 (1933) ("Actually the
resulting statement is the law nowhere and in its unreality only deludes and
misleads."); Myres S. McDougal, Future Interests Restated: Tradition Versus Clarification
and Reform, 55 HARv. L. REV. 1077, 1079 (1942) ("[T]he volume still falls far short
either of achieving the restaters' avowed goal of determining reliable rules for
prediction, or of stating... persuasive principles for policy guidance.")
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that a private legislature with a membership similar to that of the
ALI and NCCUSL and procedures similar to theirs will have a
strong status quo bias and sometimes will be captured by powerful
interests.
In addition, the products of these private legislative processes
will sometimes be characterized by vague and imprecise rules and
other times by crude but precise bright-line rules. On its face this
choice-of-rule form does not seem normatively objectionable.
Precise (Model 1) rules are useful in some contexts, while vague
(Model 2) rules delegating broad discretion to courts are useful in
others. Our analysis shows, however, that groups such as the ALI
and NCCUSL produce these rules in consequence of a particular
institutional dynamic and not because of their intrinsic virtues as
instruments for social control. We suggest that Model 1 rules result
from the desire of a dominant interest group to preserve its victory
in the legislative process (by confining the discretion of the rule
applier) and not because they are socially desirable. On the other
hand, Model 2 rules result, we believe, because reformers propose
them when they are unable to get Model 1 rules enacted. The
impressionistic data that we marshal is consistent with this theory.
Our analysis does not establish conclusively that the rules
produced by the ordinary legislative process would be less driven by
these institutional factors. We suspect, however, that typical
legislatures perform well relative to PLs for two reasons. First,
legislatures have mechanisms for agreement that permit normative
debate to reach a resolution-a resolution that will be more clearly
reflected in the resulting statutory product. Second, ordinary
legislatures have mechanisms for finding facts that are unavailable
to PLs, and are exposed to many more sources of information
concerning the effects of the proposals that they consider. Truth is
a likely corrective to outputs that are skewed by the process itself.
In any event, our purpose in this Article is to advance a much more
modest claim: whatever the relative merits of private and public
legislative bodies, the complacency that has heretofore marked the
academic attitude toward the private law-making groups is not
warranted.
There are two lessons to draw from this. The first is that
academic attention should focus on inputs as well as outputs: there
should be more theory and more evidence relating to how private
law-making groups function. It may be possible (we are dubious but
far from certain) that PLs such as the ALI can be reformed. The
second lesson is that the ALI and NCCUSL, at least provisionally,
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should no longer be immune from critical investigation. A concrete
implication of this view is that debates about whether a subject is
best regulated by a uniform law or a federal act should be influ-
enced by a perception of how uniform laws are actually made.
Because this Article makes strong claims about PLs, we close by
noting our sympathy with the views of the founders of the ALI and
NCCUSL. The founders intended their proposed organizations only
to deal with issues that satisfied two "jurisdictional" requirements:
first, that society had reached a consensus concerning the relevant
values; and, second, that those values could be translated into laws
solely with the use of traditional legal expertise. The organizations
would perform poorly, the founders believed, were they instead to
attempt the typically legislative tasks of harmonizing value conflict
and regulating complex economic activity. This Article is evidence
of the founders' wisdom.
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APPENDIX
I
We first show that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies in
which both groups lobby. Assume that the entry condition for
lobbying is satisfied for both groups. Then consider the game in
normal form where L is lobby, SO is stay out, and GI's payoffs are
written first.
FIGURE 9
,
L/L is not an equilibrium because if G,q will lobby, G1 will stay out;
L/SO is not an equilibrium because if G, will enter, G,q will enter
also (because its entry condition is satisfied); SO/L is not an
equilibrium because if G, stays out, G,, will stay out also; and SO/SO
is not an equilibrium because if Gq will stay out, G1 will enter
(because its entry condition is satisfied).
II
We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium when the entry
condition is satisfied for both groups. Beginning with G,, its payoff
from entering with probability P, if Gq enters with probability p,, is
E(II,) = p,[-cp,, + (qrl - c)(1 - pq)] + (1 - p)(0).
G, plays a best response to G,q when it maximizes its expected
payoff. Then simplifying E(fI1 ) and solving for the first-order
condition yields
-c, (r,, - C) (qr, - c), r,,(l - 2q)
, (, - C) o, n
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dE(fl 1)/dpl = qr, - c - qrp,,q = 0
and
pq = (qr, - c)/qr.
If G,, enters with this probability, then a mixed strategy is optimal
for G. If G, enters with probability pi, then Gq's payoff is
E(llq) = PJ[(rIq - c)p1 + (-c)(1 - P)] + (1 - Pq)[rtq(1 - 2q)].
Again, maximizing this payoff and solving for the first order
condition yields
dE(ITq)/dpq = pr,q - pic - r,, + 2 qrq = 0,
then
p, = [(rq - 2qrq)/(r,q - c)].
If G1 enters with this probability, then a mixed strategy is optimal
for Gq. Hence, there is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which
both groups enter with the probabilities just shown.13
. For a description of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, see supra note 77.
